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Preface 
Community-level governance is a focus in much of the public sector reform occurring in the 
world at the moment.  Interest in this topic stems from two major sources.  The first is the 
desire to strengthen citizen engagement in local government, while the second is the need to 
stimulate greater interest in local democracy, especially electoral participation. 
 
Most developed nations are facing declining voter turnout at both the local and national level, a 
trend that has been occurring for more than two decades.  Some commentators explain this 
trend as a result of declining interest in traditional political processes and suggest that the 
solution requires a ‘deepening of democracy’ by decentralising decision-making and engaging 
more closely with citizens - in other words by investing in community-level governance. 
 
Community engagement can also increases accountability and help ensure that services are 
delivered efficiently and effectively and meet the needs of the communities they are designed 
to serve.  It can also increase opportunities for voluntary effort and enhance social capital and 
community trust. 
 
These sentiments are reflected in LGNZ’s public commitment to localism, which seeks a more 
meaningful role for councils in the governance of their regions, districts and cities.  To achieve 
localism it is important to understand the international experience of community-level 
governance and be able to assess the success or otherwise of the different models in operation. 
 
LGNZ’s support for this research paper, undertaken jointly with local government organisations 
in Australia, falls under our overall policy priority “strengthening local democracy and the value 
of local government”.  Achieving a strong local democracy and strengthening the value 
proposition of local government cannot happen without good engagement between councils 
and their citizens.  This is a topic where there is mutual interest between LGNZ and Australian 
colleagues, see http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/page.aspx?u=2939 for the more information on the 
South Australian initiative.. 
 
LGNZ was pleased to be invited to work with the NSW Independent Local Government Review 
Panel and the Local Government Association of South Australia on this joint research initiative 
and hope it will be a forerunner of future cross-Tasman collaborations.  We were also very 
pleased to work with MDL which undertook the research on behalf on the project partners. 
 
 
 
LGNZ 
July 2014  
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Introduction 
About the report 
This report has been prepared by McKinlay Douglas Ltd (MDL) for the New South Wales 
Independent Local Government Review Panel (the Independent Panel), the Local Government 
Association of South Australia’s Expert Panel on the ‘Council of the Future’ (the Expert Panel) 
and Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ). It has also drawn on separate but related work 
undertaken for the Marion City Council in South Australia, and Mitchell Shire in Victoria. 
 
The report is in part a sequel to an earlier MDL led project undertaken for the Australian Centre 
of Excellence for Local Government and partners, and published as Evolution in Community 
Governance: Building on What Works1.  Among other things, that report proposed a broad 
ranging definition of community governance in these terms: 
 
We have chosen to define 'community governance' as a collaborative approach to 
determining a community's preferred futures and developing and implementing the 
means of realising them. In practice it may or may not involve one or more of the 
different tiers of government, institutions of civil society, and private sector interests. 
We have taken the view that the critical issue in defining 'community governance' is not 
whether clear and specific boundaries can be set around it, but whether it has utility in 
the sense of improving understanding of how decisions which affect a community's 
future are best taken and implemented.  
 
That definition is deliberately flexible, and may not sit well within a rules-driven approach which 
seeks to place precise boundaries around the concept. 
 
It is worth re-emphasising this point. In the work done for this project, both desktop research, 
and interviews/discussions with councils and others interested in community governance, we 
have found wide ranging differences in the way community governance has been understood. A 
number thought that the appropriate scale for a community governance approach was a 
population in the range of 5-7000, occasionally 10,000 or a few more people, and normally 
centred around a local shopping/community centre, school or other significant local facility. 
Others thought that community governance - in this case the effective engagement of 
geographic communities over decisions affecting the area - was effective at a scale of up to 
50,000-70,000. Typically this view was expressed in a context where the parent council was of a 
much larger scale again. As we will highlight through this report, what this reflects is people 
talking about quite different processes and objectives, but using the same terminology. In turn, 
what this suggests is that any legislation providing for or enabling community level governance 
should be sufficiently flexible to allow for a wide range of options. 
 
                                           
1Evolution in Community Governance: Building on What Works 
http://www.acelg.org.au/upload/program1/1334208484_Vol1_Community_Governance.pdf 
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Thus the principal focus of this report is whether local government legislation should include 
provisions enabling or obligating councils to introduce or facilitate a form of community-level 
(‘sub-council’ or ‘second-tier’) governance. Each of the three partners is interested in this 
question as they consider the future role and structure of local government within their own 
jurisdictions. At this stage, in respect of community governance, we simply note that 
community-level or second-tier governance as this report is required to consider it may or may 
not itself be a form of community governance. Whether or not it is depends at least in part on 
the purpose and specifically whether or not it is based on a collaborative approach. The 
distinction is that community governance as a concept involves communities, either formally or 
informally, in decision-making. Community-level or second-tier governance may or may not 
involve the community in decision-making as such - local boards discussed below are an 
example of a second-tier form of governance which does not involve the community in decision-
making (although it does involve the community in engagement), and which, as a result would 
not qualify as community governance. 
 
Addressing the report’s question raises complex issues including: 
 Should legislation require that every council have defined community governance 
arrangements in place? Alternatively, should it simply make provision for community 
governance an option subject to some basic principles and parameters? If it takes the 
latter approach, should community governance be in the ‘gift’ of a parent council or 
should communities be able to trigger the establishment of community governance, or 
at least a process for considering it (as is currently one option for the establishment of 
new local councils in England). 
 What powers and responsibilities should community governance bodies have? Are they 
simply advocates? Should they have certain local planning or decision-making powers – 
perhaps over ‘minor’ local works amongst other matters? Should they have the power 
to raise their own funding – perhaps, as with UK local councils, as a precept on the 
parent council’s rate? If they do, should this be limited to community governance 
arrangements which are formally part of the overall council structure? 
 How are they serviced? Should they have the right to determine their own support, or 
should they be serviced by the parent council and what would this mean for autonomy 
in operation? In either case, how should the cost of providing support be borne? By the 
parent council as a charge against its general revenues, or by the community and 
funded by a targeted or special rate? What powers should a community governance 
body have to challenge any decision of the parent council on the provision or funding of 
support? 
 
Methodology 
The methodology has been designed to draw out the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
options under review, including the impact of ‘compulsory’ rather than voluntary establishment, 
different means of servicing the boards or councils themselves, and whether formal autonomy 
in terms of funding, servicing etc plays a significant role in effectiveness. It has included: 
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 A desktop review of experience with New Zealand’s community boards, England’s local 
councils (normally termed neighbourhood or parish councils), and Auckland’s local 
boards (where material is limited because of their recent establishment), and of practice 
in selected Australian local governments.  
 On-the-ground interviews in Melbourne following up on developments with two of the 
councils which were included in the original community governance projects. 
 Interviews with a cross-section of individuals with experience of New Zealand’s 
community boards selected in consultation with LGNZ, and designed to ensure coverage 
of both good and less successful experience. 
 Interviews with a cross-section of people with experience of Auckland’s local boards – 
local board members and Auckland Council staff with responsibility for servicing local 
boards.  
 Phone and face-to-face interviews with selected individuals with experience of England’s 
local councils drawing on MDL’s existing networks within English local government and 
local government think tanks - we were fortunate commitments for another project 
allowed for time in London for some critical interviews for this project. 
 
Structure  
The report begins (Part One) with a section discussing the legislative and structural 
arrangements in each of England, New Zealand and the three Australian states covered in this 
project for the establishment of sub-council governance. 
 
In each case the discussion covers both how sub-council governance arrangements may be 
established, and their principal legal characteristics and powers. 
 
For England and New Zealand this section of the report also discusses the emergence of a non-
statutory approach to community governance which appears to be gaining significant impetus, 
which in England includes community led planning and in New Zealand, village planning. 
 
The next section of the report (Part Two) draws on case studies and interviews to bring out the 
strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches used in each of the jurisdictions under 
consideration. Its focus is on the extent to which each particular set of arrangements facilitates 
or inhibits the emergence of a community governance approach. 
 
The final section (Part Three) draws on the previous two sections, and considers the basic 
question addressed in this report: how and to what extent should legislation seek to require, 
mandate or enable the development of community governance within local government?  
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Part One: Legislative and Structural Arrangements for Sub-Council 
Governance 
 
 
England 
Local councils 
The most obvious form of sub-council governance in England is the growing network of local 
councils variously referred to as neighbourhood, parish or town councils – all essentially with 
the same set of functions, but with town councils different from the other two in that they are 
headed by a mayor. The difference in title between chair for the head of a parish or 
neighbourhood council, and Mayor for a town council is purely symbolic. Neither the town 
council, nor the Mayor, have any powers which are different from those of a parish or 
neighbourhood council, or a chair respectively. There are, as well, a number of other initiatives, 
some driven by national NGOs committed to strengthening communities in their area of interest 
(rural communities and market towns are two prominent examples), others by local authorities 
themselves innovating in response to central government policy changes designed both to free 
up what local government may do and to reduce very substantially their available resources. 
 
Legislative provision for neighbourhood and parish councils was first made in the Local 
Government Act 1894 and continues under the Local Government Act 1972 and related 
legislation. It is the Local Government Act which provides for the establishment of local councils, 
but their powers are spread through a number of different pieces of legislation (something 
which is also the case for principal authorities2.) Currently there are some 90003 or more 
councils (now collectively referred to as local councils) serving approximately 35% of the 
population. Together they employ approximately 25,000 staff with annual expenditure of 
approximately £500 million. 
 
Their functions fall into three broad categories: representing the local community (to the 
principal authority among others); delivering services to meet local needs; and striving to 
improve quality of life in the parish or neighbourhood. 
 
Among the services they may provide are allotments, bus shelters, car parks, community 
centres, community safety schemes, community transport schemes, crime reduction measures, 
cycle paths, festivals and celebrations, leisure facilities, litter bins, local illuminations, local youth 
projects, parks and open spaces, planning, public lavatories, street cleaning, street lighting, 
tourism activities and traffic calming - basically they are empowered to undertake a very wide 
range of activities of specifically local impact. 
 
                                           
2  For a listing of the main powers of local councils, see the Good Councillors' Guide available at 
http://www.nalc.gov.uk/Publications/Booklets_and_Resources.aspx   
  
3 Different, apparently authoritative, sources provide different estimates of the total number of local 
councils. 
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Local councils have the power to raise their own funding through a precept on the council tax 
which currently averages a little under £50 for a ‘D’ band residential property (D is effectively 
the median band in an eight band distribution of property values for council tax purposes). 
 
New local councils may be created by the principal authority either as the result of a governance 
review undertaken of its own volition, or in response to a petition which itself leads to a 
governance review. Some 200 new councils have been created over the past 30 years or so 
primarily as the result of reviews undertaken by principal authorities.  Principal authorities are 
able to refuse a review if one was held within the last 2 years or they are currently running a full 
review of their area. They are required to go through a detailed process, including extensive 
consultation and the publication of recommendations with supporting reasons4. There is no 
right of appeal against the decision of the principal authority, other than the right available in 
respect of any decision by a public body to seek a judicial review. 
 
Until recently there was no power to establish local councils within London, but the Localism Act 
has recently changed that so neighbourhoods within London may now apply for the 
establishment of a neighbourhood or parish council. Westminster City Council is the first to 
conclude a governance review following a petition from the Queens Park Community Council to 
be designated as a parish council. The City Council approved the application in June 2012. 
The performance of local councils varies dramatically.  The following are examples of what can 
be achieved by strong town and parish councils, even when relatively small.5  
                                           
4 See Community Governance Reviews: Some Lessons from Recent Practice available at: 
http://www.nalc.gov.uk/Publications/Booklets_and_Resources.aspx for more detail. 
  
5 Sources: Calne: James Derounian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/voluntary-sector-
network/2011/jul/22/parish-councils-save-big-society-dream) argues for a very strong role for parish 
councils. Calne is among his case studies. Offerton Park and Campbell Park: All About Local Councils, a 
2007 publication of the National Association of Local Councils and the Electoral Commission 
(http://www.nalc.gov.uk/Publications/Booklets_and_Resources.aspx).  
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One factor influencing the performance of local councils appears to be how proactive the 
principal council is in working with them. In the best examples, the local council will have a 
strong working relationship with the local ward member (often local councils are within the 
boundary of one or two wards), and through the ward member with the principal authority, 
strengthening the local council’s ability to act as an advocate to the principal authority, and 
providing a stronger basis for partnership in delivering local services. 
 
Many, however, appear reluctant to play a strong role. One factor is the essentially voluntary 
nature of the role of the local councillor6 but there are others. A 2007 study undertaken for the 
Commission for Rural Communities found that: 
 
When asked for the barriers that made it hard to act as leaders of their communities, 
parish councils, and to a lesser extent principal authority councillors, most often 
mentioned lack of powers, lack of influence and lack of resources, lack of time on behalf 
of busy councillors. However, it seems that, in the case of some parish councils, lack of 
resources is linked to reluctance to increase a small precept. There were also some 
parish councils who did not want more powers as it would increase bureaucracy and 
demands upon councillor time.7 
                                           
6 Generally, councillors on local councils are unpaid although the chair may receive a very modest 
honorarium. 
7 Strengthening the Role of Local Councillors: an analysis of the written evidence arising from the CRC 
participation inquiry accessed on 5 June 2013 at: http://www.bipsolutions.com/docstore/pdf/17620.pdf  
Calne Town Council, Wiltshire – recreation facilities 
Number of councillors 19, size of electorate 13,600 
The Council initiated plans for the Beversbrook Sports Facility that now covers 54 acres and 
"combines state of the art facilities with stunning surroundings." Calne Council owns the 
recreation ground that comprises of "playing fields, cricket square, tennis courts, bowls green, 
basketball hoops, pavilion, children's play area and general open space." In addition there are 
council-provided woodlands and nature trails, a skatepark and BMX facility, allotments, 
cemetery, and summer playscheme. 
Offerton Park Parish Council, Stockport – performance improvement 
Number of councillors 10, size of electorate 2,700 
The parish was created in 2002 after a campaign by local residents.  A key focus for the Council 
has been working to provide ever better standards of service delivery for the community, 
winning the Council the NALC/AON Website of the Year award in 2007 followed by the award 
of Quality Parish status and Charter Mark.  
Campbell Park Parish Council, Milton Keynes – celebrating diversity 
Number of councillors 20, size of electorate 10,900 
The Council has undertaken a number of spotlight events to help highlight and explore, 
understand and celebrate a variety of different aspects of the local community. They have 
directed the spotlight on the Punjab, age and ageism, Ghana, the Celtic fringe, Nigeria, Islam, 
multiple occupation housing, Hinduism, health and diversity. The programme was the 
brainchild of two Councillors and the Milton Keynes Racial Equalities Council.   
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Looking at the experience of local councils on their own, it is easy to conclude that, by and large, 
they are relatively low key entities undertaking a small but useful range of very local activity, 
but, with few exceptions, not seeing themselves as playing a significant role in the governance 
of the local community. 
 
However, that would be to underestimate the extent to which there appears to be a quite 
strong and growing move towards more in the way of effective local decision-making in England 
both through non-statutory and statutory processes. 
 
Community led planning 
Between them, two groups, Action with Rural Communities in England and Action for Market 
Towns, have over the past 30 years been involved with promoting community led planning. A 
recently published best practice guide for local authorities put out by the two organisations, 
Making the Most of Community Led Planning8, describes this as: 
 
Community Led Planning (CLP) is a step-by-step process, that enables every citizen to 
participate in, and contribute to, improving the social, economic, environmental and 
cultural well-being of their local area. It relies on people coming together locally, 
researching local needs and priorities and agreeing a range of different actions which 
help to improve their neighbourhood.  
 
Approximately 4,000 communities across England have already been involved in 
developing Community Led Plans since the late 1970s. These have allowed communities 
to take responsibility for making things happen locally, rather than waiting on others to 
do it for them. Their success has relied on volunteers who work closely with parish and 
town councils and are the driving force behind the work that takes place.  
 
The present coalition government has placed a strong emphasis on more decentralisation, and 
devolution of decision-making from central government to local authorities and communities. 
 
A 2012 presentation by an official from the decentralisation and neighbourhoods team of the 
responsible department, the Department for Communities and Local Government set out the 
principles the government was seeking to apply as: 
 
Localism, Decentralisation, Big Society 
Localism 
Is the ethos … 
Doing everything at the lowest possible level and only involving central government if 
absolutely necessary 
 
Decentralisation 
Is the process … 
Giving away power to individuals, professionals, communities, local councils and other 
institutions 
 
 
                                           
8 Accessed on 5 June 2013 at: http://towns.org.uk/files/Making-the-most-of-Community-Led-Planning.pdf  
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Big Society 
Is the vision … 
A society where people, neighbourhoods and communities have more power and 
responsibility and use it to create better services and outcomes. 
 
 
For a number of local authorities this shift in policy has been either a trigger, or a further 
encouragement, to look at innovative means of engaging with their local communities, and 
encouraging community led action. 
 
Two examples are Made in Lambeth and neighbourhood working in Derby City Council.  Made in 
Lambeth is an example of the use of digital media as a means of creating what is essentially in 
on-line community, rather than the more normal geographic approach represented, for 
example, by neighbourhood working in Derby. This makes Made in Lambeth somewhat more 
difficult to categorise within the conventional local governance framework, but a review of the 
various activities which Made in Lambeth has been involved with suggests it has the potential to 
be a very useful exemplar for councils looking to exploit new technologies as part of their sub-
council governance arrangements. 
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THE MADE IN LAMBETH STORY* 
 
Growing strong local collaboration communities through on and off-line platform creation: a 
collaboration between Lambeth Borough and Good for Nothing, a global free social action movement 
working through community events 
 
 
Lambeth is putting the citizen at the heart of everything it does. A key challenge in this is how to 
engage local people volunteering their skills in developing local services. 
 
Against this backdrop the Council is looking for fresh approaches and tools to: 
 
 Help communicate the Council’s new approaches to more people in the borough and especially 
people with the skills to help shape service strategy and a prototyping in a more hands on way 
e.g. people with experience starting and running ventures, people with design and 
communication skills and people with digital and web development skills. 
 Develop co-production approaches that can harness local peoples’ skills to identify issues, 
tackle local challenges bring new services to life. 
 Develop co-production capacity and skills within the Council organisation. 
 
The Lambeth and Good for Nothing teams agreed to co-develop a programme of events designed to 
explore new forms of on-line and off-line co-production and collaboration between the Council and 
citizens. 
 
Example challenge: Young Lambeth Co-op: Help develop an engaging brand identity and the 
communication plan for the borough’s youth services focused cooperative. 
 
The results: Expert team formed around the challenge including young people, communications 
experts and graphic. The team developed a series of potential new identities for the young 
Lambeth Co-op brand and tested them with potential Co-op members over social media. The 
work contributed to Young Lambeth Co-op being approved by the council cabinet for 
establishment as an independent legal entity. 
 
For Made in Lambeth, the challenges have attracted a wide variety of local citizens with different 
skills, producing strong tangible outputs with long-term benefits for the local area. 
 
Following the first 12 months of Made in Lambeth experimentation Lambeth Council is continuing to 
develop the community with events in April and July 2013. 
 
 
*Sourced from Digital Governance: from local data to European policies - accessed on 12 June 2013 
at: http://issuu.com/bejdak/docs/epma_digital_governance 
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DERBY CITY COUNCIL: NEIGHBOURHOOD WORKING* 
Derby City Council has adopted neighbourhood working as a way to revitalise neighbourhoods and 
to engage with local people to tackle the issues that matter to them on their doorstep. At its core 
is an area-based management approach, with a renewed neighbourhood focus at operational 
level building on the success of the previous neighbourhood management model. The aims are to 
improve the environments where people live, look for ways of improving services to 
neighbourhoods across the city, responsive problem solving and building pride within 
communities. The Council’s commitment to neighbourhood working is supported operationally by 
new structures and resourcing, the key elements of which are: 
 Neighbourhood Boards and Forums:  Boards are responsible for leading on behalf of the 
whole neighbourhood in respect of vision, priorities, budget allocations, performance 
monitoring and influencing decisions that reflect the views of local residents. They are made 
up of local councillors, residents and representatives from community organisations and 
public services. Neighbourhood Forums hold open public meetings. 
 Neighbourhood devolved community budgets, approved at ward committees and managed 
by the Neighbourhood Boards, to support activities and projects that help address agreed 
neighbourhood priorities. 
 Neighbourhood charters setting out local priorities and service standards.  
 A dedicated neighbourhood officer for each ward, supported and co-ordinated by 4 
neighbourhood managers for the city. 
 Area-based strategic management and planning. 
 A City Neighbourhood Board including Police and Fire Services and other partners to co-
ordinate and focus resources in areas of most need, providing an intelligence-led approach 
for neighbourhood services to tackle problems in a strategic and co-ordinated way. 
 
Significantly, in recognition of the increasing complexity of issues now facing local councillors, 
central to the Council’s neighbourhood working is the objective of providing additional support for 
them in their community leadership roles. 
* From information on Derby City Council’s website http://www.derby.gov.uk/council-and-
democracy/neighbourhood-partnerships/information/ 
 
Neighbourhood forums began as part of the Derbyshire County Council's local strategic planning 
structure. They were established by the county as a means of providing community based input 
into LSP considerations. Within Derby City they were based on ward boundaries. When 
government policy moved on, and local strategic planning became ‘yesterday's’ approach, the 
Derby City Council decided to retain neighbourhood forums, and the boards which provided 
governance for the forums, as part of its own community engagement/governance arrangements, 
seeing them as providing a separate but complementary structure to ward committees – in 
essence treating one as an expression of communities as such, and the other as a form of sub-
Council structure. 
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Neighbourhood plans 
In another significant development in the government’s strategy of devolution to communities, 
and very relevant to the place of local councils, and for that matter community led planning, 
planning legislation now provides for the development of neighbourhood plans9. 
Neighbourhood planning is described as: 
 
A new way for communities to decide the future of the places where they live and work.  
They will be able to: 
 choose where they want new homes, shops and offices to be built;  
 have their say on what those new buildings should look like and what infrastructure 
should be provided; and 
 grant planning permission for the new buildings they want to see go ahead. 
 
Where a local council is already in place, legislation provides for it to take the lead in 
neighbourhood planning. Where one is not, there is detailed provision for the establishment of 
what are termed neighbourhood forums – groups formed from within a community following a 
defined process and intended, among other things, to demonstrate that it is representative. The 
formal process is set out in the Localism Act 2011, and is specifically designed to facilitate the 
creation of neighbourhood forums as representative but not elected bodies. The democratic 
mandate to support establishment is held by the principal authority which, as the local planning 
authority, has the power to designate a body as a neighbourhood forum for planning purposes. 
 
Neighbourhood planning is intended to be optional rather than compulsory – communities are 
being encouraged, not required, to become involved. 
 
Neighbourhood planning must conform to the strategic planning documents of the principal 
authority. One local council town clerk with whom we have discussed this effectively regards 
neighbourhood planning as something in the nature of ‘Clayton’s planning’. Neighbourhoods are 
required to accept decisions the principal authority has made about the provision of, for 
example, a defined number of units of new housing, and local circumstances will make it 
sometimes difficult for the local council to have any real influence on how that decision is 
implemented. 
 
An alternative view, and one which appears to be more widely held, is that the role of the 
principal authority must necessarily be to set the strategic direction for its district. On this view 
there is a distinction between setting the strategic framework for development, and making the 
individual decisions about how that is expressed locally, which is properly the responsibility of 
the local council. This is also really the only practical way of avoiding the NIMBY risk that if local 
councils could override the strategic planning decisions of a principal authority, there is a risk 
that essential development, for example provision of additional housing, would be frustrated 
because all local councils wanted those developments to go ahead somewhere else. 
 
                                           
9 Departmental guidance on neighbourhood plans can be found at: 
file:///G:/ALL/Community%20Governance/2013%20Project/England/Neighbourhood%20planning%20-
%20Detailed%20guidance%20-%20GOV.UK.htm accessed on 5 June 2013 
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A recent and important development in neighbourhood planning has been the establishment by 
the government of the Supporting Communities and Neighbourhoods in Planning Programme10 
to provide both financial and technical assistance for groups wishing to establish a 
neighbourhood plan. The program is being delivered by the membership based community 
development NGO, Locality, in partnership with the Royal Town Planning Institute. 
 
Locality began receiving applications for support on 1 April 2013. More than 400 have already 
been lodged. In a parallel with what has been the pattern with community-based planning, the 
lead is being taken by non-statutory groups – in areas which do not already have a local council, 
by neighbourhood forums or groups seeking recognition as a neighbourhood forum. In areas 
which do have a local council, the council is the formal applicant but it seems is usually acting as 
the umbrella for a group within its community which it will empower as a steering committee to 
lead the neighbourhood planning process. 
 
The explanation given for the common situation that community and now neighbourhood 
planning is community rather than council led is that the demographics differ – typically the age 
and composition of the council, and of the groups involved in community and now 
neighbourhood planning are quite different. A further factor is the difference between the 
general focus across a range of local issues which is the role of a local councillor, and the specific 
focus on planning for the future of the community as such which is the focus of neighbourhood 
planning - and which has clearly encouraged people to become involved who want to be 
engaged specifically with that activity. 
 
The English experience summed up 
The English experience is clearly a very mixed one. Within the statutory realm – local councils 
formed in accordance with legislation – performance ranges from excellent with a high degree 
of engagement and significant activity on behalf of communities to very low impact indeed. It 
appears the single most important factor is the nature of the support from and relationship with 
the principal authority. A principal authority that wishes to encourage strong involvement by 
local councils with their communities will see much better outcomes than one which leaves 
them alone. 
 
Outside the statutory realm, there is a very wide range of experience ranging from local 
authority led initiatives to initiatives such as community led planning supported by the NGO 
sector. This experience strongly suggests the evolution of community governance will benefit 
from appropriate statutory powers and frameworks, but the critical factors are a combination of 
visionary leadership, and the existence of formal or informal support networks able to underpin 
community-based initiatives. 
 
This includes the capability to help communities leverage off the coalition government’s 
emphasis on localism with its initiatives such as neighbourhood planning and the community 
right to challenge and right to buy. These give local councils or for that matter community 
groups the right to challenge the principal authority for the delivery of services, or to acquire 
council assets which might otherwise be sold. For all the uncertainty about the government’s 
                                           
10 See more at: http://locality.org.uk/projects/building-community/#sthash.9A6rvgtb.dpuf  
 
 
17 
 
long-term intentions, these initiatives are clearly giving a number of communities, and the NGOs 
(and occasionally councils) supporting them, the motivation to see the potential for greater 
community-based governance as very real. 
 
One lesson for other jurisdictions from the English experience may well be that community 
governance thrives not so much because of explicit statutory provisions requiring or enabling it, 
but when communities and organisations working with them can see a real potential to make a 
difference, and an opportunity to attract at least a minimum level of resourcing to assist. 
Another may be that the approach of higher tiers of government will not necessarily be to build 
on local government itself as the medium through which to enable and support community 
governance. Although the English government has taken one initiative to enhance the role of 
local government by streamlining the governance review process, most of its initiatives appear 
designed to encourage the development of community governance outside local government 
itself. Examples include the community rights to challenge and to buy, and for the establishment 
of neighbourhood forums in areas where there are not already local councils, rather than 
further easing the process of establishing local councils as such. Each of these initiatives quite 
specifically contemplates the development of alternative community-based organisations with 
an on-going existence. 
 
New Zealand  
Here we first discuss New Zealand’s two forms of statutorily enabled sub-council governance: 
community boards and local boards; and then provide a brief overview of village planning. 
 
Community boards 
The history 
Local government in New Zealand underwent a major restructuring in 1989, enabled by the 
Local Government Amendment Act (No. 3) 1988 which provided for the Local Government 
Commission to “prepare such final reorganisation schemes as in its opinion are necessary to 
improve local government in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand”. 
 
Prior to 1989, there had been provision for the establishment within the districts of county 
councils11 of a district community council or community council, the former with specified 
administrative powers and representation on the territorial authority, the latter with advisory 
functions and no voting rights. 
 
The Local Government Amendment Act (No. 3) 1988, which set out the Local Government 
Commission’s role in restructuring local government, empowered the Commission to provide for 
the establishment of a ward committee for any ward or combination of wards as an alternative 
to a community council or a district community council. The ward committee was “designed to 
allow for the recognition of communities within a district, to increase involvement in the local 
government system and permit devolution of decision-making to representatives of 
communities within a district on matters of particular concern to those communities” (sourced 
from the Commission’s memorandum to assist in the consideration of final reorganisation 
                                           
11 Prior to the 1989 restructuring of New Zealand local government, which abolished them, county 
councils were the general purpose local authorities serving rural New Zealand - the equivalent of borough 
or city councils in urban areas. 
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schemes which formed the introduction to each such scheme). The Commission itself decided as 
a matter of general policy that it would not establish community councils or district community 
councils, and instead would establish ward committees as the only “sub-district” unit of 
territorial local government. 
 
Separately, the Government went on to legislate in what is generally referred to as the Local 
Government Reform Bill (formally the Local Government Amendment Act (No 2) 1989) for the 
establishment of a new form of sub-district government to be known as a community board. In 
response, although the Commission still had the power to establish ward committees, it 
determined it should establish only one form of sub-district governance, community boards. As 
a result, no ward committees were established. The principal difference between the two 
options lay be not so much in the powers which could be delegated to ward committees and 
community boards respectively, as in the fact that ward committees were to be appointed by 
the parent council whilst community boards were to be elected by the community. 
 
One consequence of the situation in which the Commission found itself was limited time to 
consult further with local authorities on where community boards should be established. It was 
able to identify a number of communities where it thought this was appropriate (basically 
communities which had their own council, but were going to lose it through amalgamation), but 
clearly recognised there were other cases where, given the time and further consultation with 
local authorities, it would also have recommended the establishment of community boards. 
Instead, it noted that the need for further community boards could be considered within the 
procedures established under the legislation. 
 
The role of community boards 
The minimum role of community boards is defined in the Local Government Act essentially in 
advisory terms as: 
 
The role of a community board is to— 
(a) represent, and act as an advocate for, the interests of its community;  
(b) consider and report on all matters referred to it by the territorial authority, or any 
matter of interest or concern to the community board;  
(c) maintain an overview of services provided by the territorial authority within the 
community; 
(d) prepare an annual submission to the territorial authority for expenditure within the 
community; and 
(e) communicate with community organisations and special interest groups within the 
community. 
 
The legislation also provides that community boards may undertake any other responsibilities 
that are delegated to it by the parent authority which may delegate any of its responsibilities, 
duties, or powers except — 
 
(a) the power to make a rate;  
(b) the power to make a bylaw;  
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(c) the power to borrow money, or purchase or dispose of assets, other than in 
accordance with the long-term plan;  
(d) the power to adopt a long-term plan, annual plan, or annual report; or 
(e) the power to appoint a chief executive;  
(f) the power to adopt policies required to be adopted and consulted on under this local 
government act in association with the long term plan or developed for the purpose of 
the local governance statement; or 
(g) the power to adopt a remuneration and employment policy. 
Delegation 
Practice in terms of delegation varies quite widely. A handful of councils have delegated very 
extensive powers, but the majority have delegated little or no power, often leaving community 
boards purely as local advocates. The case studies in Part Two of this report illustrate what can 
be done by councils which have a commitment to delegating decision-making to community 
boards. 
 
Establishment 
Community boards can be established either in the course of a council’s representation review 
(New Zealand’s territorial local authorities are required to undertake a wide-ranging review, six 
yearly, of their representation arrangements covering matters such as whether councillors 
should be elected at large or from wards and if so how many, the number of councillors, and 
whether or not to have community boards and again, if so, the number and the districts for the 
boards) or as the result of an application from a ‘community’ to the council for the 
establishment of a community board, which can be made at any time. 
 
The decisions of a council on the establishment (or disestablishment) of a community board can 
be appealed to the Local Government Commission which has the power to review the council’s 
decision, applying the same criteria as the council itself was required to apply. 
 
Remuneration 
An important destabilising factor in the relationship between some councils and their 
community boards has been the way in which New Zealand’s Remuneration Authority12 has set 
the remuneration for elected members. It adopted what was termed a ‘pool’ approach of 
setting a single sum to be divided amongst elected members based on the council’s population 
size and level of expenditure. For councils with community boards, half of the remuneration of 
community board members was to be met from the remuneration pool, as the Remuneration 
Authority effectively regarded governance as a fixed amount of activity with the implication 
that, if there were community boards handling governance at the local level, there would be 
proportionately less governance work at the council level. This was both misconceived in terms 
of an understanding of what actually happened in the council/community board situation, and a 
major contributor to poor relationships between many councils and their community boards. 
Unsurprisingly councillors tended to see themselves as meeting half of community board 
                                           
12 An independent statutory body charged, among other things, with setting the remuneration for elected 
members in local government. 
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members’ allowances out of their own pockets. For many, this amounted to an incentive to 
disestablish community boards. 
 
The Remuneration Authority has recently reviewed its approach, and a new system will come 
into effect with the 2013 local authority elections. Council elected members’ and community 
board members’ remuneration will be separated. The Remuneration Authority itself has noted: 
 
The long-standing tension created by councils needing to set community boards’ 
remuneration at the expense of their own remuneration is removed, and it is hoped this 
will have a positive effect on local democracy.  
 
Current situation 
Over recent years, the number of community boards has been in decline, substantially because 
of proposals by councils in representation reviews to disestablish community boards. Often this 
will reflect a combination of what is seen as the relative insignificance of a community board, 
and a parent council not placing any particular value on continuing a community board already 
in existence (especially given the remuneration situation). 
 
On the other hand, and as the case studies in Part Two suggest, a number of those community 
boards which remain (and their parent councils) have put very considerable effort into 
developing effective community governance at the local level, in some instances taking what 
amounts to a place-management approach.  
 
Local boards 
The history 
The second form of sub-council governance in New Zealand, local boards, is a recent innovation 
introduced as part of the wide ranging reforms of local government in metropolitan Auckland. 
 
The new Auckland Council came into existence on 1 November 2010. It combined six territorial 
authorities, including four of New Zealand’s largest by population, and part of a seventh, along 
with a regional council (a separate form of local government with primary responsibility for 
environmental management) to form a single council to provide local government services for a 
population of 1.4 million people. 
 
Both the Royal Commission on the Governance of Auckland, which had been established in 2007 
to consider the future governance of metropolitan Auckland, and the Government which 
received its report, supported the establishment of a single council for the whole of 
metropolitan Auckland, but also recognised the need to make some form of provision for local 
governance/local democracy. 
 
The Royal Commission recommended this be done by establishing six local councils which would 
have responsibility for a range of functions specifically defined in statute. Each would have a 
‘local council manager’ with responsibility for ensuring the effective delivery of local council 
functions. Local councils would not have the power to strike a rate, borrow, own assets or 
employ staff. These powers would be held by the Auckland Council. The Royal Commission 
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proposed that authority to employ staff for activity within the responsibility of a local council 
would be delegated to the local council manager. 
 
The primary focus of local councils would be on ‘place shaping’, local service delivery and 
community engagement. 
 
The Government rejected the Royal Commission’s recommendation on the grounds that it made 
insufficient provision for local democracy – six local councils across a population of 1.4 million 
being seen as each too large for effective community relationships. The Government decided 
instead that there should be between 20 and 30 local boards with the precise number and 
boundaries to be set by the Local Government Commission. Rather than following the Royal 
Commission’s proposal that the roles of the second-tier should be defined in some detail in 
statute, the Government decision was that the legislation should provide in general terms for 
local boards to have responsibility for making local non-regulatory decisions, with actual 
authority to be delegated to them by the Auckland Council. The boards themselves were to be 
unincorporated components within the Auckland Council, with no power themselves to employ 
staff, hold assets, borrow or otherwise raise funds.  
 
The following diagram sets out the different components within the Auckland Council, and the 
relationships among them, showing the position of the local boards as an integral element 
within the overall governance of the Auckland Council. 
 
 
 
The Local Board Role 
There has been a measure of confusion over the role of local boards within the Auckland Council 
structure, as many observers have confused them with community boards partly because prior 
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to the creation of the Auckland Council, previous councils had a number of community boards, 
and that term and set of functions is better understood. Specifically, there is not yet a full 
understanding the local boards are intended to be part of a co-governance arrangement, rather 
than a subsidiary and almost peripheral structure as was the case with a number of community 
boards within the predecessor councils. The Auckland Transition Authority (ATA), in its final 
report, Auckland in Transition,13 after reviewing the legislation observed that “In summary, 
therefore, the general intent of the relevant Auckland Council Act provisions is that the 
governing body and local boards are, with limited exceptions, autonomous within their 
respective areas of decision making.” 
 
Recent research literature on co-governance highlights the importance of clarity of thinking 
around the concept, and ensuring that whatever arrangements are put in place are supportive 
of the co-governance purpose. Somerville and Haines (200814) reporting on a detailed research 
project, Prospects for Local Co-Governance, observe: 
 
Co-governance can occur on any one scale, and can also occur across a plurality of 
scales. Where different collectivities are operating on the same scale, co-governance is 
relatively more straightforward in that their spheres of interaction largely overlap. 
Where they are operating on different scales, however (for example, a neighbourhood 
as distinct from a town or city), there is greater potential for hierarchical governance to 
displace co-governance, as the governance capacity of collectivities on the ‘higher’ scale 
is typically much greater than that of those on the ‘lower’ scale. 
 
Developing co-governance therefore crucially involves increasing capacity on the ‘lower’ 
scale in order to counteract this tendency to hierarchical governance. 
 
More generally, the emerging literature on co-governance emphasises the importance of 
autonomy which, in the local government context, includes the power to take decisions over 
matters such as funding, staffing and service delivery. 
 
Under the Auckland Council legislation, local boards are to be responsible for decisions on all 
local non-regulatory matters within their respective areas. The legislation requires the Auckland 
Council to delegate decision-making responsibility, including budgetary decisions, within 
parameters (including funding for local board determined decisions) set by the Council in its 
long-term and annual plans. The ATA in its final report set out detailed proposals for those 
matters which should be delegated. The Auckland Council adopted revised delegations as part 
of preparing its 2012-2022 Long Term Plan. 
 
Developing these has proved complex, in part because of difficulties in determining what non-
regulatory matters are inherently local (despite the statutory obligation to delegate local non-
regulatory matters to local boards, the Auckland Council may retain responsibility if the matter 
has implications beyond the boundaries of the local board). 
                                           
13 Available at: 
http://www.ata.govt.nz/web/cms_ata.nsf/vwluResources/ATAReport%28whole%29/$file/ATAReport%28w
holeminusmaps%29.pdf  
14 Somerville, P. & Haines, N. (2008) Prospects for Local Co-Governance, Local Government Studies, 
34:1, 61-79 
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Section 98 of the Local Government (Auckland Council) 2009 provides that the Local 
Government Commission may resolve any dispute between a local board or boards and the 
governing body regarding the delegations. This provision has not been used, but can be seen as 
an important measure for assuring integrity in decision-making over delegations because an 
objective third party agency is potentially the final arbiter. 
 
The statutory provisions under which local boards are established include a requirement for the 
development of what is known as a local board agreement between each local board and the 
governing body of the Auckland Council. The purpose of this agreement is to set out the scope 
of the local board’s decision-making authority, including the associated budgetary provision.  
 
Also as part of their role, local boards prepare what are known as local board plans setting out 
those activities the board intends undertaking or enabling within its area, along with the 
associated budgetary information. These feed through to and inform the development of the 
Auckland Council’s Long Term Plan (10 year plan). They are intended to cover all the matters 
over which the local board has decision-making authority and go to consultation with the 
board’s own community. The plan’s coverage will include the board’s proposals for local services 
or, where the board is an advocate rather than a decision-maker, the representations it intends 
making to the responsible party - which may be the governing body of the Auckland Council 
itself, or it may be one of the Council’s Council controlled organisations (in practice, the principal 
service producers). 
 
The 2011 local board plans describe the four key activities of local boards as: 
 
Lead: We have the decision-making responsibility for a wide range of local activities. 
 
Advocate: Acting as advocates on your behalf with other Auckland Council entities, such 
as Auckland Transport, as well as external agencies, like central government agencies. 
 
Fund: Providing funding to other organisations through community grants and other 
funding arrangements. 
 
Facilitate: Engaging and working with organisations in the local board area to represent 
and promote their interests. 
 
Current situation 
The local boards are still very much ‘work in progress’. It is as yet unclear the extent to which 
they have and exercise substantial authority within their individual areas. Although each local 
board has apparent authority for a budget in the order of $20 million, it is still far from clear 
exactly how much authority the boards are able to exercise – for example, the local board used 
as a case study for this report appears to have responsibility for a budget with operating 
expenditure of $41 million and capital expenditure of $6.8 million for the 2012/2013 year. In 
practice it seems the amount over which the board is able to exercise real discretion is 
significantly less than $1 million. One reason for the gap between the total amount of the local 
board budget, and the amount over which it can exercise real discretion, is that the Council as 
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the service provider will typically have in place purchasing and/or provision arrangements which 
cover the whole of Auckland, and thus provide relatively little discretion for local variation.  
 
Another and, in the short term, more significant matter is the fact that much of the activity for 
which local boards have formal responsibility is in practice a legacy from previous councils - the 
on-going provision of long established services. The extent to which this limits local board 
discretion is spelt out in the Council’s Local Board Funding Policy which, by statute, it is required 
to include in its Long Term Plan. It has this to say: 
 
The bulk of the local boards’ current budgets represent the costs of achieving and 
maintaining the identified levels of service provision for local activities presented in the 
LTP. They include costs related to new assets decided by the governing body, the 
renewal of assets and the maintenance and operation of existing assets. Local boards 
would receive these non-discretionary funding allocations based on budgets established 
through the activity management (asset management planning and LTP prioritisation) 
processes. Local boards have little decision-making authority over these costs. 
 
This approach ensures each local board has sufficient funding to maintain inherited 
service levels and provides funding to address the different cost structures of each local 
board stemming from their different asset bases. 
 
The practical reality that flows from the statement in the local boards funding policy is that, if 
local boards want to exercise extensive discretion over spending, it will need to be on new or 
enhanced services, and funded by a local board rate - and in the present climate, with its 
emphasis on containing costs, this is a high hurdle for any local board. 
 
Although local board areas have a population on average of approximately 70,000, the staffing 
resource is only some three or four persons for each board to provide advice, and manage the 
board’s administrative processes. Furthermore, the staff are employed by the chief executive of 
the governing body, the Auckland Council, raising the potential of a conflict in accountabilities if 
a local board wishes to adopt a different position on a significant issue from that preferred by 
the parent organisation. It also creates a potentially difficult situation for local boards 
themselves, as they do not have the normal relationship of a governing body to advisory staff in 
relation to matters such as performance and the ability of the governing body to direct staff.  
 
These issues appear to be well understood by the staff of the governing body, and recognised as 
matters which need to be sensitively managed. Nonetheless, and especially given the nature of 
large bureaucratic structures, there is an on-going question about the extent to which these 
arrangements are the best option for facilitating autonomous decision-making at the local level. 
 
One question which the Auckland Council is now considering is whether local boards with an 
average population of 70,000 are sufficient by themselves to enable the development of a 
community governance/place shaping approach which can fully engage Auckland’s many 
different communities. They certainly provide an effective means of ‘right-sizing’ engagement 
on a number of major sub-Council matters - for example the development of significant local 
recreational and other facilities; reinforcing the character of an area (Waitakere Ranges is a 
good example with its emphasis on the natural character of West Auckland’s forest and coastal 
area), and handling debate on major service related strategies, for example, transport. They 
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have clearly played an important role in on-going engagement between the Council, and 
Auckland’s different communities in developing the Auckland unitary plan (the single land use 
planning document for the whole of the Auckland region). It’s less clear that they are well suited 
to handle very local place shaping issues such as local area or village planning where the 
community of interest is typically in the order of 5000-7000 or perhaps 10,000 inhabitants. 
 
The Council has established a Neighbourhood Planning Task Group, chaired by a local board 
chair, with the purpose to promote neighbourhood planning and implementation across 
Auckland Council, in order to enhance community-driven planning and neighbourhood self-help 
projects. The intention is to consider the potential of practices such as village planning (see the 
next section of this report) and other ‘bottom-up’ approaches to community led initiatives. 
 
The objectives include creating the conditions within which community-led planning and self-
help projects can thrive, including: 
 Encouragement by local boards of “bottom-up” community-based initiatives. 
 A culture within Council, including local boards that encourage community 
empowerment. 
 Learning and development opportunities for elected members, Council staff and 
committee members at all levels, including middle managers, to support community 
empowerment.  
 Funding support through grants programs or matched funding of community voluntary 
labour through local board discretionary funds, identification of other external 
community funding sources. 
 
Assessment 
The Auckland local board experience is still very much in its early stages – the boards themselves 
have had less than one full electoral cycle. The boards, the governing body, and management 
have all been faced with developing practice where there are few if any direct precedents. 
 
There is clearly a strong sense within the Council ‘family’ that local boards are, and important 
part of governance. At the same time, there seems to have been a lack of focus on the essential 
pre-conditions for sustaining a genuine shared or co-governance model, including the extent to 
which local boards should have autonomy in decision-making. 
 
As we discuss below, there are measures which could be taken administratively to reinforce 
significantly the potential for local board autonomy. They include giving local boards collectively, 
and as individual boards, more discretion over determining how to resource their administrative 
and advisory requirements (which, in practice, might mean making the choice to recommend a 
local rate if an individual board wanted more extensive provision than the standard provided for 
local boards generally). 
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Village planning 
 
The following material is taken from the website of the Porirua City Council which, with its 
communities, has been a pioneer in the development of village planning in New Zealand: 
 
  
 
PORIRUA CITY VILLAGE PLANNING PROGRAMME 
The programme is a collaborative process between Council and communities with the aim of 
enhancing each of Porirua City's diverse local communities or ‘villages’ through involving local 
residents in planning and decision-making. The programme revolves around the development and 
implementation of village plans which document a community’s vision and priorities for action. 
To date, 11 of Porirua’s 16 villages have been involved in the Village Planning Programme. 
The first of the four strategic priorities in Porirua City’s Long Term Plan 2012-2022 is ‘A City of 
Villages’ – connected and distinctive villages, able to have their respective spaces and characters 
shaped by the people who live in them. 
The Village Planning Programme is the core mechanism for achieving this. The objectives of the 
programme are: 
1) To assist local communities in setting a strategic direction and priorities to be 
implemented in partnership with Council and other agencies. 
2) To ensure Council’s city-wide strategies and plans are informed by the visions and 
priorities of local communities. 
3) To enable Council to provide services and fund projects which recognise and enhance the 
unique characteristics of the city’s geographic communities. 
4) To foster constructive working relationships between Councillors, local residents, local 
agencies and Council staff. 
5) To encourage and inspire community engagement - leadership, volunteer input and action 
in order to achieve the community’s vision for their local area. 
6) To enhance an on-going sense of community ownership of local facilities, services etc. 
 
The origins of the programme 
The Plimmerton community (an old established and relatively self-contained seaside community) 
was instrumental in the establishment of the Village Planning Programme. Leveraging off the 
Local Government Act 2002 requirement for local government to consult with its communities, in 
2003 the Plimmerton Residents Association approached Council for assistance to develop a village 
plan. In 2004 the first ‘village plan’ – the Plimmerton Village Strategy – was presented to Council. 
The strategy detailed residents’ aspirations for their community. It was developed through an 
extensive community consultation process involving 23 street meetings and more than 300 
residents. 
Prompted by this action, Council resolved to begin the Community (Village) Plan project in 2004 
as part of the Long Term Council Community Plan (LTCCP) 2004-14. The Village Planning 
Programme has been a strategic project in all subsequent Long Term Plans.  
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Australia 
None of the three states being considered in this report, New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia, have any formal statutory provision for sub-council governance. All three, instead, use 
general provisions under their local government acts15 authorising councils to establish 
committees. Under all three acts, a council can establish a committee entirely of councillors, 
partly comprising councillors and partly non-councillors, or all non-councillors (brief details of 
the powers are set out in Appendix I). 
 
Some NSW councils make extensive use of precinct committees. For a recent overview, see 
Local Government Precinct Committees and Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) Based 
Urban Planning16.  
 
A recent pilot project, Citizens Committees in Local Government: the Role of Committees of 
Management in Victoria, provides an overview of the use of section 86 committees17. 
 
A research project for the Local Government Association of South Australia undertaken in 2007, 
Community Engagement Snapshot of Councils, reports extensive use of section 41 committees 
for a variety of different purposes.18  
 
The following table shows the range of activity: 
 
 
 
                                           
15 Respectively section 355 in NSW, section 86 in Victoria and section 41 in South Australia. 
16 Available at: http://habitattownplanningforum.wordpress.com/2012/04/05/local-government-precinct-
committees-and-ecologically-sustainable-development-esd-based-urban-planning-written-by-ray-
rauscher/  
 
17 Available at: http://www.newdemocracy.com.au/library/research-papers/item/132-citizens-committes-
in-local-government-the-role-of-committees-of-management-in-victoria 
18 Available at: 
http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/Community_Engagement_Snapshot_of_Councils_April_
2007.pdf   
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Our overall impression, which reflects the findings from the original community governance 
project, Evolution in Community Governance: Building on What Works, 19, is that there is a great 
deal of innovation taking place within Australian local government, most of it ‘beneath the 
radar’. 
 
The very fact that there is, at present, no statutory provision formally requiring or enabling sub-
council governance, in our judgement has both contributed positively to the breadth of 
innovation, and made it more difficult than in some other jurisdictions (England; New Zealand) 
to quantify the extent of activity. 
 
As the case studies which follow in the next section demonstrate, and as those in the Evolution 
in Community Governance project also do, a lot of innovation is resulting from councils 
reflecting on what kind of information they need in order to do their job more effectively, and at 
a lesser cost. Increasingly councils are seeing various approaches to community governance as a 
means of providing them with a better understanding of service delivery requirements, and of 
community preferences. 
 
 
  
  
                                           
19 Evolution in Community Governance: Building on What Works available at: 
http://www.acelg.org.au/upload/program1/1334208484_Vol1_Community_Governance.pdf  
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Part Two: Case Studies 
 
 
Scope 
Case studies undertaken for this project were a mix of desktop research, phone and face-to-face 
interviews. 
 
For the New Zealand case studies, we interviewed people from a number of local authorities 
which have community boards as part of their governance. Interviews ranged from mayors and 
community board chairs to local government staff responsible for servicing community boards. 
For the local board component, we interviewed a number of officials involved in the governance 
of the Auckland Council and in servicing local boards, and interviewed the deputy chair of one 
case study local board. 
 
In Australia, we revisited two of the councils which were case studies in the original community 
governance report, Evolution in Community Governance: Building on What Works (Yarra Ranges 
and Port Phillip), and were fortunate to incorporate work for one other Melbourne area Council, 
Mitchell Shire, and two South Australian councils, the City of Marion and Barossa Shire. We also 
include an extract from the Evolution in Community Governance report’s case study of Golden 
Plains; although it was not included in the research for the current report, Golden Plains is 
widely recognised as an exemplar of community governance in a council with a number of 
geographically distinct communities. 
 
For the English case studies we relied on a mix of desktop research, email correspondence with 
people directly involved with neighbourhood and parish councils, and with community led 
planning, and a telephone interview with a researcher specialising in neighbourhood and parish 
councils and in community led planning and thus able to provide an overview of the relationship 
between the two. We were also able to have three face-to-face interviews in London with 
people who have a national perspective on current developments, including one person whose 
responsibilities include overseeing the government funded support program for neighbourhood 
planning. 
 
Victoria-Melbourne 
Yarra Ranges and Port Phillip  
One of the themes which came through in the Evolution in Community Governance report was 
the need for further reflection on the respective roles of elected members, management and 
the community. This included who should be responsible for leading a council’s community 
governance activity, the tension between the traditional representative democracy role (“we 
were elected to take decisions”), and a more facilitative role of working with communities, the 
relationship between elected members and council management, and the capability (and 
legitimacy) of community groups and others engaging with the council. 
 
Yarra Ranges provided a very good example of a council with a large number of smaller 
communities within its district which was seeking to work with community groups within its 
different townships as a basis for strengthening relationships between the Council and 
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communities. Port Phillip provided an example of a much more densely populated inner urban 
authority with a strong commitment to community governance, and seeking to involve its 
communities closely in decisions which affected them. 
 
Yarra Ranges had invested in supporting community groups which met its criteria as a township 
group (sustainability, representativeness). This included a dedicated staff member whose job 
was to assist township groups, providing them with advice on how to seek funding and on 
capability development. The council also facilitated a regular meeting of township groups to 
discuss matters of common interest. 
 
Port Phillip’s commitment to working with its communities was expressed through a councillor 
view that engagement should be led by councillors, and implemented through the 
establishment of a number of reference groups as the basis for input into (and almost shared 
decision-making on) council decisions. 
 
We found that each had changed its practices, partly as a consequence of turnover in council 
membership following the 2012 elections, and partly as the councils re-thought how best to 
work with their communities. 
 
Yarra Ranges had found that sustainability of township groups was a major issue. Too often 
groups had been dependent on one person or a small core, and when they became less 
involved, the group tended to fade away. This emphasised the need for on-going resilience 
which a number of the groups were unable to meet. 
 
The council still supports those groups which remain in existence, but has shifted its emphasis 
towards local area planning. It is at the early stage of ‘community conversations’, seeking to 
identify communities with a core group of people who are interested in being early participants, 
and with the prospect of establishing an on-going community based capability able, with the 
support of the council, to take the lead in developing a local area plan (the council is still also 
determining exactly what a local area plan might be in practice; drawing on earlier Victorian 
experience of community planning and will no doubt look at other examples such as Porirua’s 
village planning initiative). 
 
The Port Phillip approach worked partly because the councillors in office from 2008-2012 were 
able to make a full-time commitment as, for one reason or another, they did not need to be in 
paid employment. In 2012 four of those councillors stood down, and one was defeated, 
resulting in a substantially new Council. It is in a different situation (several current councillors 
are in paid employment) which has contributed to a different approach. Led by the Mayor, who 
has a strong background in corporate governance, the Council has shifted its emphasis from 
direct involvement by elected members, more to one of elected members setting the strategy 
and providing oversight of the Council’s community governance and engagement practices but 
with the expectation that generally it is the staff who will be involved with community reference 
groups and other initiatives. 
 
This highlights one of the dilemmas faced by councils with relatively high representation ratios – 
the Port Philip Council has seven elected members for a population of 90,000. One of the 
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previous councillors referred to Jeff20 Kennett’s comment that councillors should be steerers not 
rowers. In his experience that was not what the community wanted; they wanted to see their 
councillors present and they wanted that to be in their time and their space. 
 
The result, at least for elected members who believe they need to be personally engaged with 
their communities, is a very real dilemma. With as many as 13,000 or more residents for each 
elected member, it is simply not possible to be closely involved with the affected community on 
each significant council decision - one decision alone could involve scores if not hundreds of 
hours of time taken to work through an issue and finally arrive at a decision all parties are 
prepared to accept.  
 
Foreshadowing the discussion in the next section, this does raise the question of how issues are 
‘owned’ and developed. The Port Phillip case in 2008-2012 was one of a council wanting to 
involve its communities in council decisions which would affect them. Although not exactly a 
‘top down’ approach, this is one which does require a major commitment of council time, 
including councillors if they believe they need to be involved. The alternative, exemplified by 
cases such as Porirua’s village planning, or the best examples of Victorian community planning, 
is one of a relatively minimal demand on councillor time. Typically it is the community which will 
have ownership of the issue through a village planning group or similar body, and the principal 
council input will be a facilitator who will work with the group, make the necessary connections 
with council expertise, and ensure the work feeds into the council’s own planning. 
 
Mitchell Shire 
The third example from Melbourne is Mitchell Shire. The real interest in this case study is the 
challenge for a council managing an area which not only has a number of different communities, 
but communities which face very different drivers. Mitchell Shire combines a fast-growing part 
of the Melbourne growth area with a more rural/small township area. These areas have very 
different needs in terms of infrastructure and social services, and very different lifestyle 
preferences. 
 
Mitchell Shire is far from being the only Australian local authority facing this dilemma. For the 
purposes of this report, the question which the Mitchell experience raises is whether councils 
with this kind of diversity and difference in pressures across its district should nonetheless try to 
function as a single tier council, or whether they should quite consciously adopt a two tier 
approach so that issues specific to different parts of the district can be dealt with and decided 
within the affected locality, rather than by the council as a whole. Among the implications this 
raises, is how the different parts of the district should be serviced - from a single central council 
office as is the case for Mitchell Shire at present, or through local area offices able to build a 
much closer and more community specific focus? 
 
Frankston City 
Frankston City Council provides an example of emerging practice with the approach it is taking 
to local area planning. The Council’s work with the communities across its district has led to an 
acceptance it has six relatively distinct communities with which the Council should build a strong 
relationship as the basis for its own planning. It’s adopted a local area planning approach, 
                                           
20 The Victorian State Premier who drove the restructuring of local government in that state in the 1990s. 
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working with township/community committees which are established largely through a process 
of self-nomination to work together to set priorities for the individual communities, and to feed 
through into council wide planning including the Council’s “community conversation” informing 
its own long-term planning. 
 
The following diagram sets out the planning relationships and shows how local area community 
plans feed through into council policy strategies and plans. 
 
Integrating Community Planning: 
 
The following two examples, taken from recent council minutes, illustrate the types of issues 
which currently come up through local area community plans: 
 The Seaford Local Area Plan reflects the high level of participants’ enthusiasm and 
commitment to their local area. In particular the community wishes to establish a local 
‘Voice’, have a focus on connectedness, establishing a music festival, safety cleaning up 
Kananook Creek and maintaining the village atmosphere.  
33 
 
 The key things that Karingal wishes to prioritise are establishing a newsletter and using 
the Karingal Committee as the ‘voice’ of the community with a focus on improving 
safety and public transport in the area, establishing a ‘Karingal Pride Day’, leash free 
areas for dogs, a community garden in the Gretana Reserve and a mentoring program 
for young people.  
 
An important feature of this case study, which comes through in a number of other case studies 
where local area planning, village planning or community led planning is a feature, is the 
importance which is attached to sequencing as between community-based planning and council 
planning. Community-based plans should be seen by councils as an important source of input 
into their own plans, and a source which is ideally available prior to their preparation - in other 
words it informs council plans themselves as they are developed, rather than being presented 
during the consultation phase on an already substantially finalised document. 
 
Victoria-Golden Plains 
The Shire's Council plan recognises 35 separate communities, 22 of which have established 
community planning groups (formally, they are constituted as section 86 committees of the 
Council, with members appointed from the local community). These groups are becoming an 
integral part of council decision-making.  
 
The Council not only has a requirement that staff should report on what community 
consultation they have undertaken when recommendations are made to the Council; it also has 
an established cycle for regular communication with community planning groups. Each group 
presents to a Council meeting once every 12–18 months which means that virtually every 
Council meeting has a community planning group presenting. In addition, Council staff prepare a 
six-monthly report to Council picking up on generic issues from across different community 
plans, and a synopsis of community plans for consideration at the annual council retreat.  
 
How the Shire’s community planning has evolved  
 
Community plans began as a means for individual communities to identify relatively small local 
issues which were of immediate concern – and could be something like the positioning of a 
pedestrian crossing, or parking outside the local school.  
Over the years, the planning process has moved much more to become the basis of a 
community governance approach both at the local community level, and for generic issues of 
Shire-wide impact.  
 
At the community level, the community plan is an important input for the Council's own 
planning documents, and community planning groups are an integral part of the Council's 
consultation arrangements.  
 
The Council has recently made the decision to grant $5000 to each community planning group 
to be applied to implementing one or more of the objectives in its community plan. Many 
groups are using the funding to leverage additional funding from other funding sources.  
 
At the 'whole of Shire' level, community plans have proved an important tool for identifying 
major gaps which need to be addressed. The first was public transport within the Shire. Here the 
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issue was that many families had only one car which was typically used for commuting to work, 
leaving the rest of the family with no transport. The Council was able to use the information in 
community plans to negotiate funding from the state government under a local transport 
initiative.  
 
The next major gap was access to health services. Community plans showed the need for a 
medical facility in the northern part of the Shire. The Council brought a range of stakeholders 
(providers, government departments, community leaders) together to look for a solution. This 
led to the establishment of the Golden Plains Health Planning Forum which meets three times a 
year to look for solutions to identified health needs within the Shire. Achievements include the 
establishment of additional health facilities, substantially improving access for residents. 
 
South Australia - City of Marion 
Marion is a city of approximately 85,000 residents within the Adelaide metropolitan area. It is a 
mix of residential and commercial/industrial, with an attractive coastal frontage. 
 
The city is rethinking its approach to engagement with its communities, seeing effective 
engagement not just from a community development/place shaping perspective, but also as an 
important contributor to the Council’s core roles in areas such as infrastructure and economic 
development. It’s a real focus on understanding the ‘value add’ for a council of having better 
information on its communities’ priorities, including willingness to pay.  
 
The Council has established an asset management steering group, one of the roles of which will 
be to focus on service level standards based on community input. It regards economic 
development and community development as mutually supportive – “the synergies between 
economic development and community development are very important - people like to run 
businesses in places which are safe and attractive which means bringing in the wider 
community.” 
 
It is experimenting with ways of developing “bottom-up” approaches. As one example, it is 
looking at how to turn IAP221 “on its head”. Its reasoning is that for all its emphasis on 
engagement and participation, the IAP2 spectrum is actually top down, especially the first three 
stages of “inform, consult, involve”. In a council context, this can risk running the council’s 
agenda at the community, rather than seeking to understand what the community’s agenda 
might be. 
 
One example will illustrate the approach the Council is now taking. It is handling a development 
planning application for a very major mixed residential, retail and commercial development on a 
former industrial site which faces a number of complex issues including the need to remediate a 
former council tip, manage significant traffic flows and integrate the development with the 
surrounding residential area. The scale of the development site can be seen from this overhead 
photo: 
 
 
                                           
21 IAP2 is an international member association which seeks to promote and improve the practice of public 
participation or community engagement, incorporating individuals, governments, institutions and other 
entities that affect the public interest throughout the world. It promotes a five stage spectrum for 
engagement and participation which has been widely adopted by councils throughout Australia. 
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The adjoining residential area could be significantly impacted. The developer had made it clear 
that at least part of the development would be relatively high density. The community reaction 
against this, with concerns such as potential loss of views, was considerable. 
 
The approach the Council took was that it should facilitate dialogue about possible options, with 
the objective that before getting into the formal consultation and submission process, there 
could be substantial agreement on how the development would proceed. 
 
It convened a first public meeting as an on-site interactive discussion with council officers 
present to assist people from the community put their views forward using four separate 
charettes. Representatives of the developer were present but purely as observers. 
 
The council had also engaged a cartoonist who had originally trained as an urban designer. He 
was present to observe the dialogue and get a sense of what were the major matters concerning 
residents as part of preparation for a second meeting which the Council convened to provide 
feedback to residents on what they had put forward at the first meeting, including implications 
and possible solutions. 
 
The cartoonist led the feedback using a series of vivid and humorous illustrations which proved 
to be a very effective tool for enabling people to understand options. A good example was the 
way he was able to deal with concerns about intensification; the real worry that multi-storey 
development on the site would block views. With some very good cartoons it was possible to 
show how the site’s variable levels would allow development at different heights, up to 8 
stories, without interrupting views from surrounding properties. 
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It also enabled the council to illustrate a number of the potential benefits for the surrounding 
area, including the establishment of needed services not currently available (for example a 
medical centre), and better control of traffic. 
 
It’s a good example of an innovative approach to dealing with potential conflicts before they 
become bound into formal statutory processes with their much more adversarial culture. 
However, it also raises the question of how councils best manage this type of major community 
shaping process. In Marion’s case, the Council needed to build connections with the local 
community as part of preparation for considering a major development planning application, 
rather than having an existing structure available through which it could work - which could 
have been the case if there were some kind of community governance arrangement in place. It 
also faces the on-going question of how it continues to manage relationships with the 
community as the project evolves.  
 
An issue which this raises for councils generally is thinking about specific experiences of 
community engagement as a form of investment. If a council has made the significant effort 
which Marion has done in handling this development proposal, then it makes sense to build on 
the goodwill and community networks which have resulted, rather than risk letting them die 
away. In this particular instance, an obvious opportunity would be to encourage the 
establishment of a local community governance group to work with the council and the 
developer throughout the development (and possibly afterwards) as a means of ensuring that 
the community’s priorities are well understood, and can be addressed in a timely manner (and 
potentially to pick up on any other issues of concern to that particular community). 
 
New Zealand 
We look first at community boards and then local boards. 
 
Community boards 
The experience with community boards varies markedly across the local government sector, 
reflecting the lack of prescription in the Local Government Act leaving councils wide discretion 
to determine the scope for community boards. Notably: 
 Of New Zealand’s 61 territorial local authorities only 41 have community boards. Some 
of these have community boards covering the whole geographical area, while a majority 
have partial coverage, or just one community board for a particular community.  
 Further, their roles vary significantly. Most simply have the minimum advisory role set 
out in the Local Government Act (see page 17 above). A minority have a more fully 
devolved role with significant delegated responsibilities, their councils regarding their 
community boards as an integral and influential part of community engagement and 
decision making.    
 
For case study purposes, we selected three district councils, all examples where community 
boards play active roles in the governance of their districts.  Each is a combination of urban 
(small towns) and rural settlement.   
 
The three councils are Otorohanga, Southland and Thames-Coromandel District Councils. 
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In all three councils, community boards have delegated authority, within budget, over all local 
expenditure. In each case the parent council has consistently taken the view that local matters 
should be decided locally. This includes recommending local rates. Councils may not delegate 
the power to strike a rate, but these three councils almost invariably accept community board 
rating recommendations without question, so that the boards themselves generally have what 
in practice is budgetary autonomy, subject to the constraint that they themselves are 
accountable to the communities for their decision making on the level of the local rate. 
 
All three councils see working through community boards (and in Southland’s case, in addition, 
‘community development area committees’) as not just consistent with local democracy, but 
also a very effective way of understanding just exactly what services people want and are 
prepared to pay for, and of mobilising community support.  
 
Also in each case the community boards have a high level of support from council staff, which 
has been important for administrative and policy capability, and ensuring a good flow of 
information and mutual understanding of their respective accountabilities, aspirations and 
constraints.    
 
Community Boards in Thames-Coromandel District  
The Thames-Coromandel District Council has gone the furthest of the three councils, adopting a 
new community governance model in 2012 as a key part of the Council's moves to empower 
communities and community boards, and allow more local self-determination to occur. In doing 
so, the Council consciously took into account directions being taken nationally and to some 
extent internationally in devolved governance. 
 
Led by the current Mayor, elected in 2010, the Council has as a key objective local 
empowerment at both governance and management levels. Sitting behind this has been an 
intent to adopt some of the features of the two tier system of governance introduced to 
Auckland with the amalgamation of Auckland councils, and the Council's belief that devolving 
more decision-making to community boards, and basing key staff locally, would reduce the 
Council's operating costs, eliminating the time and cost for the Council and for people dealing 
with it generated by the distances people and information otherwise had to travel. A third 
consideration – and achievement – has been the scope for more cost-effective outcomes as a 
consequence of taking decision making closer to the community, and bringing more local 
knowledge and resources into decision-making.22  
 
New delegations to the five community boards, adopted in August 2012, “give effect to a new 
partnership approach to the governance of the district that will be delivered primarily through 
the five community boards”, and extending to the boards the roles of providing local leadership.  
 
                                           
22 By way of example, in one community board-led initiative, and in partnership with the Ministry of 
Education, the Council recently signed off a $100k capital contribution to a swimming pool located on 
school premises, along with an annual operating grant, with an agreement for public use. This was a 
cheaper solution to the provision of a public swimming pool and avoided having the Council duplicate 
facilities. 
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A report to the Council proposing the new delegations sets out the clear intent to “delegate 
authority and, as far as possible, responsibility to Community Boards to allow the five 
Community Boards to effectively govern and determine issues associated with their local areas.” 
The report is quoted in Appendix II.  
 
The delegations speak for themselves as an indication of the proactive process through which 
the Council has devolved decision-making authority to the community boards. Of particular note 
are provisions covering the authority granted to community boards to make governance 
decisions relating to a wide range of activity, along with the transfer of decision-making 
functions including developing community board plans and proposing budgets “that would 
generally be approved by Council subject to affordability and Council being satisfied it is meeting 
its overall accountability requirements”, decisions on leases associated with Council owned 
property (associated with local activities) in their jurisdiction, approval of all local activity levels 
of service and developing and approving local policies such as Reserve Management Plans. 
 
Critical to the implementation of the new governance model is a new ‘place-management’ 
structure of area offices with area-based Council teams working with the community boards. 
Area managers have been appointed at second tier management level23 with increased 
responsibility to deliver local services and budgetary authority for expenditure within their 
areas; budgetary authority for expenditure within their areas; community development roles 
have been introduced to work with communities on local projects and initiatives; and project 
engineers report through area managers.  The area managers coordinate among themselves to 
ensure reasonable consistency across the Council’s five community boards. Changes have also 
been made to the reporting lines for other Council staff positions. The effect is to bring together 
the relevant skills and responsibilities around the local area.  
While it is still early days, and work on implementation of decentralised decision-making 
continues, substantial components are in place. These include: 
 Specified delegations for the management of local activities by the community 
boards, alongside the specification of district services that remain within council 
management (see Appendix II).  
 Community Board Plans developed and adopted by the community boards working 
with their communities. These are a key tool in the Council’s refocused planning and 
budgeting processes, setting out and representing each community’s priorities and 
reflecting the distinctive character of each. These were trialled in the 2013/14 Annual 
Plan24 process with the intention that they feed into the preparation of Council 
planning documents, rather than being part of the public submission process on 
Council’s draft plans. They provide structure to the annual work programme, 
consultation and a strategic approach to planning initiatives and priorities for board 
areas. The Council will generally accept Community Board Plans within reasonable 
affordability. 
 Active involvement of community boards in council decisions on district services. The 
Council has specifically agreed through the delegations to seek community board 
input before making significant decisions relating to district activities. Community 
                                           
23 This makes them part of the Council's executive management team. 
24 For detail see the Council's 2013-2014 Annual Plan at 
http://www.tcdc.govt.nz/Download/?file=/Global/3_Our%20Services/FINAL_2013_2014_Annual_Plan_Lo
w_Res_For_Web[1].pdf 
39 
 
boards may make formal recommendations to the Council and may be represented at 
every council meeting. 
 Progressive implementation of changes to organisational, staffing and budget 
arrangements to align with community board governance and local management.  
 
The new governance model is expected to result in greater cost effectiveness for the Council 
and its communities, building as it does on existing community board structures and bringing 
with it new possibilities for resourcing community services such as through funding sourced 
from within the community. 25 The intent throughout has been to deliver greater local decision 
making and leadership by looking for opportunities in existing legislation and in the directions 
emerging more widely in local government in New Zealand and elsewhere. 
 
Community Boards in Southland District 
Southland District has long been recognised for the success of its devolved governance 
arrangements. The Mayor of the past 20 years came on to the District Council at the 1989 local 
body elections, the year that saw the introduction of legislative provision for community boards. 
She sees community boards as fundamental to effective decision making and to community 
development in the region.  
 
As well as being the Council’s ‘eyes and ears’, the community boards, along with the network of 
community sub-committees, have been the means by which small towns and individual 
communities have done everything from building a debt-free events centre (milling their own 
timber) to museums, pools, walkways and mainstreet upgrades. In another example, some 10 
years ago one community board (Te Anau) got behind the planning and implementation of a 
$7.5 million airport funded by a combination of local rates, land development and land sales. 
 
Along the way has grown a great sense of community ownership and community participation.     
 
With extensive delegations, the 12 community boards are empowered to make decisions on 
water supply, sewerage, drainage, reserves, footpaths, street lighting, camping grounds, traffic 
management, waste management and many other local activities. They are also involved in the 
preparation of and recommendations on local rates.  Approximately 30% of the Council’s rates 
take comes from ‘community rates’ and 70% from ‘district rates’.  
 
The boards do their own long term (10 year) community plans, asset management plans for 
their community infrastructure and activity management plans for reserves and other activities.   
 
The Council has taken its commitment to delegating decision-making the additional step of 
creating community development area (CDA) sub-committees – currently numbering 16 – which 
are sub-committees of the Council, and can have the same delegated powers as those enjoyed 
by the community boards. They are formed when a request is received from a community, and 
local support can be demonstrated. CDA sub-committee members are elected at public 
meetings following the three-yearly council elections.  
                                           
25 For example, making greater use under the new governance model of an approach taken some ten 
years ago to establishing a community library that is operated and partly funded by a community group, 
with a contribution from the local Community Board and Council. The library is achieving the purpose of 
meeting community needs at a lower cost than fully Council-operated and funded libraries. 
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CDA sub-committees were established to further encourage local representation in assessing 
the needs of communities and to promote local input into decision-making. A further factor was 
the Council’s concern to provide a means of representation for communities that were not 
within a community board area. The CDA option is used also within community board areas 
where there is a community interest in establishing a governing body for a specific local facility, 
often recreational.  
 
Operating at a lower level than community boards, some CDAs are responsible for all activities 
in their communities, while others are responsible only for recreational facilities. CDAs can make 
recommendations to community boards and/or Council. 
 
Taking devolution even further, the Council has also created a community trust “to provide 
leadership and governance” for one community, and other sub-committees with delegated 
responsibility for very local water supply services, for managing harbour and jetty facilities and 
in one case for making grants and loans. 
 
Two examples illustrate the sorts of outcomes achieved by such extensive sub-governance: first, 
the Te Anau community’s acceptance of higher rates to fund the community’s preference for 
enhanced library services; and second, the huge amount of community support and volunteer 
resources mobilised behind the Tuatapere Hump Ridge Track, an important scenic walkway and 
tourist attraction largely built by the local community in the Tuatapere Community Board area.  
 
Among key factors that account for the success of Southland’s community boards and the sub-
committees are full access to Council staff support, the regular collaborative communication, 
formal and informal, between the Council, boards and sub-committees and the interaction 
between boards and sub-committees and their communities.  
 
Community Boards in Otorohanga District 
Like Southland, Otorohanga’s community boards go back to the 1989 local government reforms, 
when two community boards were established based on its two principal settlements which 
were seen as being sufficiently distinct to have a separate layer of representation. They are the 
township of Otorohanga itself (with a population of 2,700), and the more distant coastal 
settlement of Kawhia (with a population of 380, rising to over 3,000 at the peak of the holiday 
season). Kawhia has the rather special feature that to allow representation for the very small 
settlement of Aotea (35 residents), a nearby also coastal settlement, with its own interests and 
aspirations, a community boundary was created and provision made for a community board 
member to be elected from Aotea.      
 
Unusually, the majority of the district by population – the large rural area – does not have 
community board coverage. The Council has found that, in practice, the rural population has a 
fairly consistent set of interests, mainly roading (60% of the Council’s total expenditure), and 
that its needs for engagement on policy and planning issues are well met at Council level. 
 
A belief in breaking down decision making to the smallest possible unit and community of 
interest has led the Council also to striking rates on properties within the defined areas of 8 
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rural halls, the funds being passed on to the hall committees to use as they see fit for 
maintenance of the facilities.   
 
The two Community Boards have delegations enabling them to take decisions on local matters, 
empowering them to act as though they were the parent Council, with the same powers and 
authorities. The Council’s Governance Statement expresses this as delegation of “all of the 
Council’s functions, duties and powers” in respect of each community, relating to: 
 
 refuse collection and disposal 
 water supply operation and maintenance 
 sewerage treatment and reticulation 
 flood protection 
 storm water drainage 
 
 swimming pools 
 security patrols 
 housing for the elderly 
 community property 
 medical centres 
 
The Community Boards each put forward the levels of service their communities require. These 
are formally reviewed and negotiated with the Council every three years. They also recommend 
local rates. 
 
The cost allocations as between each community and the Council for a substantial number of 
Council-level activities (around 28 or 29) are negotiated on the basis of community access and 
benefit.  
 
These provisions are complemented by the way the Council manages financial matters, 
described in its Long Term Plan thus: 
 
Three financial divisions [within Council] recognise the three areas of the District with 
Community Boards (Otorohanga Community and Kawhia Community) and the Rural 
area. The existence of financial divisions ensures that activities not benefiting the whole 
of the District or impacting areas of the District differently are considered in an 
appropriate forum and that identifiable areas of benefit pay for the benefit received. 
Activities that are considered to benefit all areas of the District are included in the 
District wide rate and/or UAGC and are not allocated to the three financial divisions. 
 
The rates received within each financial division are generally spent in that area. The 
Community rating areas are under the control of a Community Board. 
 
Devolved responsibility is accompanied by devolved risk taking. In one example, the Council has 
facilitated the Otorohanga Community Board undertaking a significant residential and industrial 
subdivision within the township, under specific agreement that any surplus will be held to the 
credit of the Community Board, and any loss would need to be recovered by it. 
 
One important consequence of assigning a high level of autonomy and responsibility to the 
Community Boards is the ability to attract good people to serve office – in the words of the 
present Mayor, “influential movers and shakers”. People see it as a serious role and an 
opportunity to make a real difference. Elections are well contested.   
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Of particular note is a strong culture of community representation within the district. That 
people have been happy to wear the cost of the Community Boards is demonstrated by the 
affirmative response to the Council putting the question with consultation on each Long Term 
Plan. A high value is placed on representation with full engagement, and on rates being spent 
where they are raised rather than on priorities set elsewhere. Over the years residents have 
come to look to the Community Boards to make decisions they know won’t be overturned by 
the Council, and to manage local affairs without being second-guessed. The Council, for its part, 
has been willing to see the boards exercise significant control over council activities in each of 
those communities.   
 
Common themes 
In each of these New Zealand case studies, we have looked for common themes which might 
explain why community boards in these districts have evolved with significant authority and 
standing, whilst those in other areas have remained relatively low key, lacking both much 
influence with their parent council and real support within their communities. 
 
There appear to be three critical factors: 
 
 The first is geography, or terrain. In our three council examples, each district 
encompasses communities that by virtue of geography have distinct identities and 
communities of interest. The 12 community boards in Southland reflect the district’s 
multiple settlements, covering a large, spread-out rural district made up of a number of 
small townships and their rural hinterlands. Otorohanga has two principal settlements, 
the township of Otorohanga itself; and the seaside settlement of Kawhia nearly 2 hour’s 
drive away. Councillors for the then (1989) newly established Otorohanga District 
Council quickly decided that delegating functions to community boards was an effective 
way of managing the problem of distance. Thames-Coromandel is an extremely rugged 
peninsular with five significant areas of coastal settlement each distant from the others 
over relatively challenging terrain divided by the spine of the Coromandel Range.  
 The second factor is leadership. In each case the councils have been led by people with a 
strong commitment to community engagement and belief in the benefits of decisions 
that impact locally being taken locally. Thames-Coromandel is a good recent example of 
the importance of this, with the present Mayor leading the drive for the greater 
empowerment of community boards. Also important is the leadership that comes from 
communities themselves, with people encouraged to ‘step up’ because of the level of 
community engagement offered by active community boards. 
 Third is the factor of the relationships between councils and community boards. As one 
Mayor put it, this starts with a genuine intent on the part of the Council to delegate 
decision making and to follow this through consistently across council functions and 
with the necessary resourcing. It also depends on a culture of mutual respect, well 
understood roles and responsibilities and regular two-way communication. In Thames-
Coromandel this extends to a willingness on the part of Councillors to budget for 
significantly higher remuneration for community board members than is typical.  
 
One question is whether these approaches to community boards will survive changes in 
leadership. Certainly the three councils would argue that they now have processes in place, and 
an organisational culture, built on recognising the real value it brings – including better 
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knowledge resulting in service level standards much more directly related to local priorities and 
to what people are prepared to pay, and a high sense of ownership of local projects. 
 
This suggests that an important element in effective sub-council governance is the creation of 
supportive processes, explicit recognition of the value that comes through better knowledge, 
the ability to get community support for activity locally, and the development of a supportive 
organisational culture, all matters which should be part of the role of elected members, 
especially the Mayor, and of the chief executive.  
 
It is much less clear that specific statutory provisions have much influence, other than providing 
a legislative framework enabling councils to develop sub-council governance arrangements 
which meet the interests of their communities.  
 
Local boards 
A question arising from the case study work on local boards, and which is central to the focus of 
this report, is whether local boards serving an average population of some 70,000 residents can 
themselves be an effective vehicle for community governance/engagement, especially when the 
representation ratio (the ratio of residents to elected local board members) exceeds 10,000:1. In 
terms of preserving local democracy in the context of mega-authorities such as Auckland (or the 
mega-authorities of Sydney, Liverpool and Parramatta which could result from the proposed 
restructuring of metropolitan Sydney), there may in practice be two quite distinct functions: a 
means for effective engagement with communities around the nature and scope of more formal 
types of local planning and delivery of ‘traditional’ services – essentially about issues such as 
cost, service level standards, the location of major local infrastructure and the like – and a 
separate means for engagement with communities in more of a genuine ‘place shaping’ mode 
focused on the quality of places at a very local level. 
 
This is a point which goes to the heart of the issues being discussed in this report. It’s not just 
about the nature of ‘place shaping’ itself - which arguably is an approach would should apply in 
large and small communities alike, but reflecting the difference in scale. It’s also about the 
demands which ‘place shaping’ can impose. A number of the case studies undertaken for this 
report, and a lot of the other research considered, highlight that ‘place shaping’ at a very local 
level can be very time intensive precisely because decisions at a very local level have much more 
intimate and personal impacts on residents than decisions across large areas. As a consequence, 
a local governance structure of the type seen in Auckland’s local boards may theoretically be 
able to facilitate a community governance approach to decision-making within its various 
communities, but in practice simply be unable to handle the time commitment involved. 
 
The local board structure is unique in local government within the English-speaking world, with 
its combination of apparently significant responsibilities for quite large populations, and its lack 
of any direct authority to act on its own volition – delegations come from the parent Council; 
local board servicing is provided by the parent Council; and the processes they follow in 
planning and consultation are developed and delivered by the parent Council which is also 
responsible for local service delivery including the employment of staff and/or the hiring of 
contractors. 
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Commentary in the course of the case study work highlights a number of issues which would 
need to be thought through carefully by any other jurisdictions considering adopting the same 
or a similar model. They include: 
 Whether local board areas are themselves too large for effective community 
engagement, especially in a place shaping manner – the fact the Auckland Council is 
considering an equivalent of Porirua City’s village planning model is significant. 
Alternatively, is it that place shaping as an approach which can apply at a number of 
different scales; the small and intimate around the local neighbourhood, the sense of 
locality which distinguishes one part of a major district from another - West Auckland 
from North Shore? 
 How much discretion really exists within the model? It is clear the delegated authority 
to make decisions on non-regulatory local matters is not absolute. The parent Council 
remains responsible for service delivery, whether by itself or by third parties, and clearly 
makes service delivery decisions looking at efficiencies and economies of scale across 
the Council as a whole, rather than giving individual local boards discretion to decide on 
by whom and how services should be delivered. 
 The apparently limited ability of local boards to build up their own significant local 
board servicing capability. In practice they are limited by the extent to which the parent 
Council is prepared and able to allocate resources. One area in which this has been an 
issue is the availability of planners to assist local board form a view on planning matters, 
especially with the on-going development of the unitary plan which will establish a 
single statutory land use plan for the entire Auckland area. 
 
Regardless, it does seem clear that in an authority the size of Auckland it is important to provide 
the public with ‘bite sized’ opportunities for engagement in formulating council proposals which 
may affect the places where they live or where they work. Auckland’s 21 local board plans 
provide this opportunity. That, of course, is an argument for some form of sub-council 
arrangement within the larger councils, and not necessarily for the specific arrangements in 
place in Auckland. 
 
As a separate matter, there are strengths in the staff being an integral part of the overall Council 
organisation rather than being separate from it and developing local board-centric practices. 
They include the information exchange which takes place informally when people are part of the 
same organisational structure, and share the same physical location. On the other hand we have 
been told that there are instances of tension when local board advisers may be required by a 
board to take a different line on an issue – on occasion, colleagues have questioned whether 
local board advisers are part of the bigger council team, or part of the opposition. This can be 
seen as a healthy expression of contestability where different views do need to be tested, but 
can also create an awkward working environment (there is some relevant experience within the 
scrutiny process for English local authorities, where the staff responsible for supporting the 
scrutiny function are employed by the local authority. On occasion, where scrutiny staff have 
been responsible for reports critical of council activity, the consequences have been adverse for 
the staff themselves.) 
 
A further issue with the organisational arrangements comes from the imperative, within a large 
organisation, to develop standardised practices and processes oriented around efficiency. Local 
board plans, local board agreements, and local board procedures have generally been 
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developed as templates, carrying with them something of a ‘one size fits all’ effect. Although 
generally this works well, our understanding is there are cases where the template approach is 
seen as limiting the discretion of local boards to reflect differences in the way that they and/or 
the community they represent want to handle any particular matter. If it doesn’t fit the 
template, it’s just that much harder. 
 
The resourcing question seems to have been considered as a choice between two options which 
could be seen as extremes: all staff employed by and accountable to the chief executive of the 
Auckland Council, and servicing local boards within guidelines established by the chief executive; 
or staff employed by and directly accountable to individual local boards. A further option, 
establishing a separate entity as a collective of the local boards in order to employ staff, and 
focused especially on generic policy issues (including the form of local board plans and local 
board agreements), does not seem to have been considered. 
 
London Councils which represents the interests of the 32 London boroughs provides a rough 
parallel illustrating the benefits of a collective approach, and creating an employment structure 
which avoids potential conflicts between the objectives of the employing authority, the 
Auckland Council, and the objectives of the bodies for which the staff undertake their work, the 
local boards. Its role includes developing policy positions which are common to all or a number 
of boroughs, and to negotiate with the Greater London Authority and other public sector 
stakeholders on ‘whole of London’ matters. 
 
England  
The English experience is not strictly speaking a case study as we have had only a limited 
opportunity for interviews with people involved with sub-council governance in England. These 
interviews were complemented by Internet searching, and email exchanges exploring 
developments in the role of neighbourhood or parish councils, and community led and 
neighbourhood planning. 
 
The English situation is in a state of flux for reasons which include: 
 The extreme reductions in central government funding for local government coupled 
with an expectation that local government will maintain service levels. 
 The on-going localism project which now includes the ‘community right to challenge’ 
(take over local authority delivered services) and the ‘community right to bid’ (to 
purchase local authority owned assets), as well as other extensive provisions for 
devolution. 
 A new emphasis on neighbourhood planning26 as part of the statutory planning process, 
including the right for communities to establish neighbourhood forums in areas where 
there are not neighbourhood or parish councils able to undertake the neighbourhood 
planning role (where those councils exist, they have a statutory monopoly over 
neighbourhood planning). 
 
                                           
26 For an overview of neighbourhood planning, see the article What is Neighbourhood Planning on the 
website of the Department for Communities Local Government available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/neighbourhood-planning  
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One experience which looks particularly significant in terms of thinking about sub-council 
governance in Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand is the now well-established practice of 
community led planning. This is described as: 
 
Community Led Planning (CLP) is a step-by-step process, that enables every citizen to 
participate in, and contribute to, improving the social, economic, environmental and 
cultural well-being of their local area. It relies on people coming together locally, 
researching local needs and priorities and agreeing a range of different actions which 
help to improve their neighbourhood.   
 
Two NGOs, Action with Rural Communities in England and Action for Market Towns, have 
between them provided support for the development of some 4000 community led plans. In 
their published best practice guidance, they argue community led planning is best undertaken in 
close collaboration with the community’s neighbourhood or parish council, or if there is no such 
council, the principal local authority. The point being emphasised here is that even where there 
is an effective form of sub-council governance in place (a neighbourhood, town or parish 
council), community led planning has a role to play and is better led by the community with the 
support of the council, rather than undertaken as a council led activity. 
 
Similar inferences can be drawn from the experience of community planning in Victoria, and 
village planning in New Zealand. Essentially, what the experience overall points to is that 
community led planning needs to be exactly that. This suggests the role of councils (or for that 
matter sub-council structures such as local boards wanting to encourage community led 
planning in the part of the district for which they are responsible) is to act as a 
facilitator/enabler.  
 
The experience also supports the view the use of sub-council structures as a means of advancing 
community governance is likely to work better when the decision to establish one results from a 
community interest, rather than a decision that there needs to be a network of sub-council 
structures across the district of a parent council. This is reflected in the voluntary nature of 
neighbourhood planning in England, the Southland District Council’s policy on the establishment 
of community development area subcommittees, Porirua City Council’s approach to village 
planning (now being considered for Auckland’s local boards) and Australian examples such as 
Golden Plains. 
 
There is a further implication as well; the effectiveness of sub-council governance structures 
depends very much on whether the responsibilities they have are of a nature which will attract 
genuine commitment from people within the community - typically involvement in sub-council 
governance is either voluntary in the sense of unpaid (England’s local councils), or remunerated 
at a relatively nominal rate in relation to the time involved (New Zealand’s community boards). 
Community led planning, village planning, neighbourhood planning are all examples of roles 
which clearly appear meaningful and are thus able to attract real commitment. This compares 
with what seems all too often to be the case with statutory sub-council governance 
arrangements which either have limited authority, or a broad span of responsibility with no 
particular focus. They can be good but their quality may be highly variable. As James Derounian 
(op. cit.) observes in respect of England’s local councils, “But there is a basic problem, and that is 
the variability of local councils; just like the old adage, when they are good they are very very 
good, and when they are bad they are terrible.” 
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Part Three: How and to what extent should legislation seek to require, 
mandate or enable the development of ‘sub-council’ governance within local 
government? 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to address directly the central question posed in the Introduction: 
whether local government legislation should include specific requirements allowing or obligating 
councils to introduce a form of community-level (‘sub-council’) governance.  
 
The NSW Independent Panel uses the generic term ‘local boards’ and suggests that they would 
carry out functions delegated by a council or County Council (regional body) and could be 
established: 
 To replace small rural or remote councils that lack the capacity to undertake a full range 
of local government functions – as a general rule, the Panel considers that conversion to 
Local Board status would be appropriate for councils with current or projected 
populations of less than 5000.  
 To provide representation and some delegated service delivery at suburb or district level 
within very large metropolitan councils.  
 As a transitional measure to ensure continued community identity and representation 
when several existing small-medium councils are amalgamated into a much larger local 
government area.  
 
The Local Government Association of South Australia, in its just released discussion paper 
Towards the Council of the Future27, anticipates: 
 
A range of structures [will be] utilised to facilitate improved community governance 
including local and/or community boards and relevant Council committees are 
established with independent people appointed to these committees based on the skills 
and experience they bring to the tasks at hand.  
 
The changing role of local government - and the need for community governance 
The work we have done reviewing current and emerging practice in New Zealand, the three 
Australian states which are the subject of this study, in England, and the New South Wales and 
South Australian Panels’ own consideration of the future of local government all suggest a 
widening scope resulting from the way thinking about the role of local government is changing. 
 
It is becoming much more common to envisage local government as working in partnership with 
state (national) government agencies and other stakeholders, and with its communities to 
deliver their preferred outcomes. This can be seen in the work of the South Australian expert 
panel on the ‘Council of the Future’, in the way in which both the New South Wales 
Independent Panel, and the associated Local Government Acts Task Force describe the role of 
                                           
27 Available at: 
http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/LEPanelDiscussionPaper_CounciloftheFuture_30Aug201
3closingdate.pdf  
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local government, and in developments in New Zealand, including the work of the social sector 
trials28 which involves collaborative working at a local level. 
 
This way of thinking about local government envisages it acting not just as a coordinator 
bringing parties together, but as a conduit for channelling information, and building networks so 
as to better enable ‘on the ground’ delivery by quite a wide variety of different parties. We 
already know that the typical council is not the governance of a single homogenous community, 
but of a variety of diverse communities with different circumstances, needs and preferences. 
Necessarily this means that if councils are to be effective conduits for information about the 
needs and preferences of their individual communities, they themselves will need effective 
means of assembling information community by community, and building the networks which 
will both provide that, and have the capacity to partner in the activities needed to deliver the 
outcomes being sought. 
 
Experience from all the jurisdictions considered in this report suggests doing this requires some 
form of community governance mechanism – not just good engagement mechanisms operated 
by a council, but some form of infrastructure at the community level capable of delivering an 
on-going involvement and involving individual communities in decisions about their preferred 
futures, including local place shaping. 
 
A further element which has come through in the work for this report is the value a number of 
councils are placing on some form of community level planning, not just as consistent with the 
principles of local democracy, but as an important input for council decision making. It may be 
useful information on service level standards and willingness to pay which will lead a council to 
rethink its service level standards and the levels of investment it should be making in 
infrastructure. It may be a better understanding of the priorities individual communities have 
for local enhancement works, or addressing local social or economic issues. 
 
Approaches differ 
How to provide for these different forms of community involvement appears especially 
challenging if there is a view that the answer should be a broadly similar approach to apply 
across the whole of a given jurisdiction’s local government sector. Wellington City Council (the 
council for New Zealand’s capital) has put forward a proposal for restructuring local government 
in the Wellington region which places a strong emphasis on the need for flexibility in community 
governance arrangements. It seeks the creation of a single unitary council uniting itself and four 
other councils, and assuming the environmental and other functions currently discharged by the 
Wellington Regional Council. One of its key objectives is to provide for “genuine, responsive 
representation of local communities and genuine support for their wishes and aspirations – not 
                                           
28  Local government plays an integral part. See http://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-work/work-
programmes/initiatives/social-sector-trials/ The Social Sector Trials involve the Ministries of Education, Health, 
Justice and Social Development, and the New Zealand Police working together to change the way that 
social services are delivered. The Trials test what happens when a local organisation or individual co-
ordinates cross-agency resources, local organisations and government agencies to deliver collaborative 
social services. All levels of government and NGO support were described as enabling Trials success, 
specifically: 
 Local government helped elicit community engagement and local buy-in to the Trials. 
 “… This gives responsibility to us and is not dictated from on high so the enthusiasm generated is ours, 
we are helping our own.” (Local Government interviewee) 
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a fixed, inflexible structure that purports to represent local needs without having the power to 
do so effectively.” 
 
The Council proposes this be done by the use of community boards where and for what 
purposes communities may prefer. Its proposal is, among other things, a rejection of the use of 
a Wellington equivalent of Auckland’s local boards. Its reasoning is:  
 
Crucially, community boards offer a level of granulation not possible with other 
approaches such as local boards. Community boards instead enable the formation of 
communities that may be as small as Ohariu-Makara with fewer than 10,000 residents 
concerned or as large as Tawa at around 25,000 residents. 
 
Regardless of the populations, those community boards are self-determined and 
reflective of an almost neighbourhood to neighbourhood approach rather than arbitrary 
areas with populations of around 65,000 residents as may be the case with local boards. 
 
The Wellington approach is clearly based on a view that local communities are entitled to their 
own democratically elected means of contributing to decision-making on matters which 
primarily affect their place. It is complemented by an emphasis in the proposal on the use of 
other tools including direct democracy. 
 
In a different approach, Brisbane City Council relies on staffed ward offices as a principal means 
of working with its communities, providing residents and ratepayers a point of contact in their 
locality. This is supplemented by extensive use of social media, but from reviewing the Council’s 
website does appear to be very much a council driven rather than a community driven approach 
to determining how to engage, what issues should be priorities, and how decisions affecting 
individual communities are taken. As an example, the Council has developed a number of 
neighbourhood plans but its website is quite explicit that it is the Council that decides when and 
how a neighbourhood plan should be developed. 
 
It is difficult to judge how effective this approach is in terms of facilitating genuine community 
involvement as there does not appear to have been any independent evaluation. Paradoxically, 
this may be because the approach has been in place for a number of years (Brisbane City Council 
was established in 1925 as a ward-based council), and so has long been part of the ‘taken for 
granted’ way the Council does business, rather than something that should be regularly 
reviewed in the light of changing conditions. 
 
The ‘large metropolitan’ case 
Next, and picking up on the question of what may happen in large metropolitan councils, is the 
practical issue of how large councils consult with their ‘communities’ on the priorities they 
should be establishing in areas such as service delivery and the development of physical and 
other infrastructure. A council with a population of several hundred thousand or more residents 
faces a very real challenge in getting meaningful feedback if all it does is put out a discussion 
document – say a draft community strategic plan – dealing with the whole of the council’s 
district.  
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One of the benefits the Auckland local board structure brings (as a function of smaller scale, 
rather than of the particular structure) is that public engagement over most services, and over 
‘whole of Council’ strategies and plans, is broken down to a relatively ‘bite-sized’ scale, rather 
than the public being forced to cope with documents dealing with the city as a whole. The 
Council’s development of its Unitary Plan (the single land use plan for the entire Auckland 
region) provides a good example. Local boards have been very active in working with their 
individual communities, and presenting their views to the governing body.  
 
The advantage of this approach is not just for individual communities, making it easier for them 
to engage; it is also for large councils themselves, especially elected members. Inherent within 
current understandings of how councils work with their communities is that key strategic 
documents (land use plans, long-term and annual activity and funding plans) should go to public 
consultation, with the right for people who make submissions to appear in person before the 
council. In the absence of the opportunity of appearing before a local board, if even only one in 
1000 residents in a city the size of (say) Auckland chose to exercise that right, the council would 
be faced with hearing more than 1400 submissions. 
 
The same issue of ‘bite sizing’ engagement will arise if there is any significant consolidation 
within either metropolitan Sydney, or metropolitan Adelaide. Auckland’s scale is an extreme 
example, but the growing emphasis on community engagement and participation in choices 
about the nature of the places in which people live and work suggests the need for ‘right sizing’ 
engagement will be equally important for much smaller, albeit still large, councils. 
 
What makes for successful ‘bottom up’ approaches? 
A further matter to consider, arising from experience in the jurisdictions we have been looking 
at, is what makes for successful “bottom-up” community governance and neighbourhood 
planning. Provision in statute does not seem to be sufficient, and may not even be a necessary 
precondition. New Zealand’s community boards range from superb, and an integral part of the 
parent council’s governance of its communities, through to virtually irrelevant. England’s parish 
and neighbourhood councils seem similarly to cover a very broad spectrum. Some will be 
actively involved in working with their communities in determining their priorities and how best 
to achieve them, but both in New Zealand and in England they appear to be the minority.  
 
Of particular interest is that community led planning as it has developed in England, although 
operated in collaboration with local councils where they exist, is largely driven by non-statutory 
arrangements outside of council, something which, according to observers with whom we have 
discussed this, is now being repeated with neighbourhood planning (with local councils typically 
working through steering groups from the community, rather than undertaking the 
neighbourhood planning role themselves). In each case the explanation appears to be the 
different composition of the typical elected body on the one hand, and the emerging 
neighbourhood/community groups on the other – it’s partly a matter of demography, partly a 
matter of neighbourhood or community planning bringing together people with an explicit 
interest in the outcomes of that process as compared with elected members on local councils 
who have responsibility for a broader range of activity (and themselves typically are volunteers 
in the sense that they are unpaid). A number of the more interesting initiatives in Australia, 
including the emergence of local area planning, although working closely with councils and 
typically with council support, are also non-statutory. 
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Those comments, of course, go to the issue of what is now described as bottom-up planning. 
They do not apply to the separate issue of how a large metropolitan council manages local 
democracy and decision-making, including consultation and engagement with its communities. 
A structure such as Auckland’s local boards or Brisbane’s ward offices looks necessary for this 
purpose, but not necessarily for bottom-up engagement. 
 
Two separate elements 
In considering how best sub-council governance may be enabled, we recommend, as this section 
has already signalled, recognising there are two separate but important elements involved.  
 
Facilitating local democracy and decision-making in large metropolitan councils – the first 
element 
Facilitating local democracy and decision-making (including engagement – information flows) 
within large metropolitan councils does need some form of statutory framework as part of 
councils’ on-going planning and reporting requirements. It’s about how to create the essential 
building blocks for overall council plans when scale dictates that effective management of the 
information flows and engagement to support democratic decision-making means operating at 
a sub-council level. It recognises, also, that community governance as a process for communities 
to share in decision-making about the future of ‘their’ place will need to take different forms at 
different scales and for different purposes. 
 
Considering the Auckland experience with local boards, we hypothesise that an arrangement 
such as local boards for ‘bite sizing’ consultation between a very large council and the 
population of its district on the content of its major planning and operational documents, 
especially in terms of service delivery, and the priorities which should be established for this in 
different parts of the Council’s area, should not also be burdened with an expectation that it is 
the primary means for delivering the localised ‘bottom up’ aspect of community governance. In 
Auckland this appears to have been recognised, with the Council’s initiative to explore the 
potential for local boards to facilitate an equivalent of Porirua City’s village planning – where the 
planning activity is undertaken at a community level, but with some facilitation/resourcing from 
the Council (presumably in the Auckland instance provision in the budgets of individual local 
boards), and the plans themselves then feeding into local board plans, and the parent council’s 
planning. 
 
In essence there appears to be a need to manage the potential for a conflict between, on the 
one hand, the demands of efficiency and administrative simplicity around the planning and 
engagement processes through which agreement is reached on budgetary and service delivery 
issues for individual local board areas, and how their planning processes feed up into the 
council’s own plans, and on the other, the way local ‘bottom up’ community governance works. 
The former requires consistency, and leads towards a template approach; the latter is very 
much about arrangements that meet local circumstances and may differ from community to 
community. The former requires a minimum uniform level of activity and performance (if local 
boards are the means for taking decisions on a defined range of matters, and providing input 
into the parent council’s own planning, then all local boards need to work to a common 
timetable). The latter requires the flexibility to design arrangements that meet local 
circumstances, and work to a timetable that meets local needs. This seems so even if one 
intention, ultimately, is that each local arrangement within a single council should ultimately 
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feed into the same set of council processes – as with the Frankston City schema at page 31 
above. 
 
‘Bottom-up’ governance - the second element 
How well sub-council governance may be enabled to best facilitate the ‘bottom up’ process of 
communities identifying their needs and priorities, and being able to feed those in (when 
appropriate) to the council’s own planning, is the other element. From the practice we have 
reviewed, one important factor is that, almost regardless of the size of the council itself, 
communities in the sense of neighbourhoods, and local communities of interest, will often be 
little larger than 5000-7000 in population, will seldom exceed 12-15,00029, and will be centred 
around very local facilities such as a primary school, church or a local shopping centre. 
 
Next, it is clear that the development of ‘bottom up’ community governance is not something 
that can easily be rolled out across an entire district simultaneously, at least if what is being 
sought is a genuine and strong commitment from the community itself. Finding the right timing 
is a function of a number of factors, including the skill and empathy of the council or other 
enabler, the council’s own resource constraints (part finance, part people), the existence of local 
leadership potential, and ideally an immediate issue or two which people in the local community 
want to get engaged with. 
 
Experience shows councils have a pivotal role to play in enabling ‘bottom up’ community 
governance. Typically this will be delivered through a combination of democratic leadership 
within the council, which could be the Mayor, a ward councillor where there are wards, or 
ordinary elected members. In larger councils, it may best be delivered through elected sub-
council bodies such as Auckland’s local boards. It is councils as organisations which have the 
capability and the resource to undertake the on-going role of enabling and supporting this type 
of community governance at least until it becomes self-sustaining (which will typically be a 
combination of developing capacity/capability, and attracting adequate resourcing - which may 
often involve a council through, for example, striking a special rate). 
 
Experience also shows there is a clear need to present engagement, and more broadly working 
with communities, as something that adds very real value for a council in terms of its own 
organisational objectives. As one example, engagement policies should recognise the very real 
benefits for councils in having a better understanding of their communities’ priorities in terms of 
infrastructure development and maintenance, and willingness to pay. There is evidence that 
doing this well can substantially reduce the level of commitment councils need to make in the 
provision and upkeep of infrastructure services. 
 
It’s important, finally, to highlight the virtual certainty that effective sub-council governance 
arrangements will be a prerequisite to local government being able to act on behalf of its 
communities in bringing together state (national) agencies and other stakeholders, and its 
communities, in seeking their preferred outcomes. 
 
 
                                           
29 But may do so significantly where there is a clear and distinct, often geographic, community of 
interest. Tawa within Wellington City provide such an example - an area geographically separate from the 
rest of the council and generally regarded as having its own distinct set of needs. 
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Our proposals 
We deal first with the ‘large metropolitan council’ case, and then with ‘bottom up’ community 
governance. This latter will cover a range of different circumstances, including recognising 
different communities within an existing council, providing for some on-going representation for 
communities whose councils have been merged, and addressing the specific situation of 
councils which may be too small to be viable. 
 
The ‘large metropolitan council’ case 
Our assessment of the Auckland experience is that the option of adopting an equivalent of 
Auckland’s local boards has merit as a means for enabling large councils to ‘bite size’ their 
council/community relationship with residents across the whole council district. Almost 
inevitably local boards themselves will be constrained by the administrative imperatives of the 
parent council and in all likelihood need to work to some extent within well-established 
templates which may limit the extent of local discretion30. Nonetheless, there is a case to be 
made for a mechanism which is manageable and accessible at a sub-council level for the publics 
of large metropolitan councils who want to engage about council activity within their local area 
without being caught up with ‘whole of council’ planning and other procedures. As already 
noted, this is equally important in terms of managing the burden the Council itself would 
otherwise face in dealing, for example, with submissions on major initiatives including annual 
and long term plans. 
 
For large metropolitan councils, there are at least three choices for sub-council governance, 
each with different characteristics (Brisbane’s use of staffed ward offices could be seen as a 
fourth choice). These are: 
 the equivalent of Auckland’s local boards; 
 community boards as in New Zealand; and 
 the use of council committees.  
 
In part, the choice of option will be governed by the extent to which sub-council governance is 
seen as an integral part of the parent council’s own planning and service delivery activity, so 
that there is a need for comprehensive coverage and a consistent set of responsibilities. 
 
In contrast with the other two options, local boards would need to be adopted across an entire 
council district, and their activities will be tightly integrated with those of the parent council, as 
they are an integral part of the parent council’s own planning and service delivery 
arrangements, including annual and long term plans. What they provide is an elected sub-
council forum as an alternative means for the community within the local board district to 
debate the local non-regulatory activities of the council within the area, and put forward their 
priorities for consideration, via the local board, by the parent council. 
 
Community boards, and council committees, could be put in place across the whole of the 
district of a council, but need not be. Both are options which a council could offer to make 
available for any interested community or communities. In another contrast with local boards, 
                                           
30 Note the Wellington City Council's concern discussed above regarding the apparent inflexibility of local 
board arrangements. 
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the question of what role they would have can be decided on a case-by-case basis (at least 
above a baseline of local advocacy in the case of community boards).  
 
There are two significant differences between community boards and council committees as a 
means of providing for sub-council governance. The first is that community boards are elected, 
but council committees are appointed (note there is a growing body of experience, especially 
with neighbourhood forums in England, in how to appoint legitimate and representative 
bodies). The second is the establishment (or disestablishment) of community boards, if the New 
Zealand practice is followed, is a quite formal process involving public consultation, and the 
Local Government Commission or equivalent as an appellate body. In contrast, all that is 
required to establish (or disestablish) a council committee is a resolution of council. 
 
There is also evidence community and local boards do indeed provide effective local 
representation – elected members who are relatively accessible as compared with members of 
the governing body (e.g. the Auckland Council). This includes strong advocacy of local issues to 
the principal authority. It can also include civic duties. In Auckland there is a growing practice for 
the local board chair to be invited to officiate at events within the local board area which in 
other districts would normally involve a mayor (four example, officiating at citizenship 
ceremonies).  
 
Legislation should, as one option, provide for the establishment of local boards within very large 
councils broadly following the Auckland approach31 but explicitly recognising that community 
governance is a separate function which local boards themselves may be less well placed to 
deliver directly, but could foster and support as part of their role. Appendix III provides an 
overview of the New Zealand process for establishing local boards and community boards, 
including the role of the Local Government Commission. This may be a useful precedent (the 
New Zealand Government is currently considering some changes to legislation, including 
removing the 400,000 population a council must exceed if local boards are to be an option). 
 
Not all jurisdictions have provisions similar to those in New Zealand establishing the role of the 
Local Government Commission. Introducing a statutorily based provision or provisions for sub-
council governance in jurisdictions which currently have no such provision should include 
measures setting out a process or processes for the establishment of sub-council governance. 
This should include the respective rights and responsibilities of councils and communities, and a 
means for oversight/implementation, possibly following the New Zealand Local Government 
Commission model. 
 
‘Bottom up’ community governance 
An important issue, not always taken into account when thinking about options for sub-council 
governance, is a fundamental difference between most parent council activity, and most activity 
undertaken at a sub-council governance level.  Parent council activity is typically (although not 
always) in the ‘must do’ category - local infrastructure, regulation, delivering on the 
requirements of higher tiers of government. 
 
In contrast, most sub-governance activity – developing local non-statutory community or village 
plans, acting as an advocate to the parent council, organising or facilitating local community 
                                           
31 Appendix V summarises the legislative provisions under which Auckland's local boards operate. 
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activity – is inherently discretionary. It may be important, but there is not the same imperative 
that it must be undertaken as applies with parent council activity (Auckland’s local boards are an 
exception because they have a number of explicit statutory obligations, which are integrated 
with the parent Council’s planning and other processes). 
 
Typically this is coupled with a difference in resourcing; even under today’s financial constraints 
which face most local government jurisdictions councils tend to be relatively well resourced and 
staffed, whilst most sub-governance arrangements are significantly under-resourced 
(sometimes admittedly because of a reluctance to seek sufficient funding through a precept on 
a council tax, or a recommended local rate). 
 
In turn, this leads to a fundamental difference between the governance roles at the council and 
sub-council levels. It’s probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that council business 
generally would continue more or less in a business as usual frame regardless of the extent to 
which individual elected members actively involved themselves in governance, or simply act as 
passengers. The situation is very different at the sub-council level; it’s the governance level that 
drives most activity, and unless people in the governance role are actively engaged, little or 
nothing will happen. They simply do not have the equivalent, even allowing for the difference in 
scale, of the organisational and other resources which are taken for granted at the council level. 
 
In practice this creates a context in which often sub-council governance structures significantly 
under-perform because the people involved with them simply do not have the combination of 
incentives, resourcing and statutory or other obligations, which encourages or requires them to 
perform. It is noteworthy from the different arrangements considered in the preparation of this 
report that the best performing sub-council governance arrangements were ones where the 
people involved had a real motivation to deliver. The commonest examples are cases where the 
sub-governance entity had as its main focus developing a community, village or local area plan 
and the belief the resultant plan would help shape the community they wanted. 
 
The inference we draw from this is that statutorily mandating a requirement to put sub-council 
governance in place across a local government sector is, by itself, unlikely to produce the 
desired result. Instead, it needs to be accompanied by measures for facilitating and enabling the 
development of community governance (sub-council governance), including ensuring that there 
are in place incentives which will encourage people to want to be involved (the incentives need 
not necessarily be financial; instead they should come from creating an environment in which 
people understand that being involved will provide the opportunity of obtaining outcomes they 
want to see for their community). 
 
Both in New Zealand and in the three Australian states included within this project, there is 
already broad-based statutory power for councils to create sub-council entities with very real 
flexibility in terms of their power and their membership. What is lacking is any requirement or 
guidance, statutory, or non-statutory, encouraging councils to use the power they have to 
facilitate or enable sub-council governance. Each of the three Australian states can establish 
committees with few or no council members – membership could be drawn entirely from a 
discrete community within the council area, and be delegated a very wide range of powers 
(other than powers such as to strike a rate, borrow or employ staff). Understandings between a 
parent council and such a committee could extend to accepting recommendations on matters 
outside a committee’s formal delegations. Basically the same situation applies in New Zealand 
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except that any committee must have at least one councillor amongst its membership. New 
Zealand local authorities, of course, also have the power to establish community boards as a 
statutory form of sub-council governance. 
 
An immediate question in using the council committee approach is how the membership of such 
a committee would be constituted, as council committees are appointed, not elected. Councils 
using this alternative have, in our view correctly, not seen trying to establish some form of 
electoral process as an appropriate means. Instead there is a body of emerging practice for 
using a combination of self-selection, and recommendations from sources such as elected 
members, staff with knowledge of the area, and local leaders. Experience suggests this is 
generally an effective process – and something that should be covered in the council policy on 
community governance suggested below. Note also that the precedent of the designation of 
neighbourhood forums under the provisions of the English Localism Act 2011 provides a very 
useful, if somewhat detailed, precedent for a statutory framework for establishing a largely self-
selected but essentially representative body (see Appendix IV). It is a precedent that could also 
be drawn on for use in drafting the proposed council policy on community governance. 
 
In our judgement, considering the material which has been reviewed in the course of preparing 
this report, statutory provisions dealing with sub-council governance could deal with all three of 
the ‘bottom up’ situations identified, recognising different communities within an existing 
council, providing for some on-going representation for communities whose councils have been 
merged, and addressing the specific situation of councils which may be too small to be viable. 
 
The specific case of small non-viable councils 
However, we also note the specific situation that exists in both New South Wales and South 
Australia of groups of inherently small non-viable councils which by virtue of their geographic 
scale, small population, and often limited rating base (often leaving them overly reliant on 
grants) may find it difficult to survive as stand-alone entities, but have communities which are 
very attached to their local identity. The option of being merged into a larger council, and 
becoming instead a form of sub-council governance – perhaps a community board, perhaps a 
council committee – may not be very palatable. 
 
The New South Wales legislative provisions for the establishment of county councils offer an 
interestingly different option which may provide an acceptable solution. Under the legislation it 
would be possible for a group of councils (or the Minister) to propose the establishment of a 
county council, which could assume most if not all of the functions of the individual councils. 
They would retain their identity as elected councils. They would also appoint the members of 
the governing body. This offers the opportunity both of preserving local identity and democratic 
accountability, and of creating a more viable structure for undertaking council activity (both 
back-office and customer facing). 
 
South Australia lacks provisions equivalent to the New South Wales legislation on county 
councils, but the provisions in its Local Government Act relating to the Boundary Adjustment 
Facilitation Panel may provide an alternative. The South Australian legislation sets out the 
principles which the Panel is required to apply. They include: 
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 the importance within the scheme of local government to ensure that local 
communities within large council areas can participate effectively in decisions about 
local matters. 
 a scheme that provides for the integration or sharing of staff and resources between 
two or more councils may offer a community or communities a viable and appropriate 
alternative to structural change options. 
 
Proposals must be initiated either by councils (all of whom must agree) or by defined numbers 
of electors. 
 
These provisions may offer the possibility, without legislative change, both of putting in place 
statutorily enabled requirements for sub-council governance, and the option for creating a 
statutorily enabled collective means for delivering defined services. 
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Part Four: Options 
 
 
Our recommendations are set out below. They include discussion of implications and possible 
options and variations that might be considered to allow for different circumstances and 
preferences. 
 
1. Legislation for ‘local boards’ for large metropolitan councils  
For large metropolitan councils, legislation should provide for the equivalent of 
Auckland Council’s local boards as a means of ‘right-sizing’ arrangements for 
engagement with communities on council strategies, policies and service delivery. This 
would need to include the development of local board plans –plans spelling out 
preferences/priorities for service delivery and other activity within the area of the local 
board. The question of what decision-making authority local boards should have 
remains complex. The Auckland arrangements are still in a settling down phase, with 
differing views on how effective local boards can be in taking and ensuring the 
appropriate implementation of decisions on local non-regulatory matters. Rather than 
providing for broad delegation as a matter of right (but with some difficulty in 
interpretation), as with the Auckland Council, it may be better to provide that the 
parent council have discretion to delegate, and rely on the political/democratic process 
to deliver an acceptable level of delegation (if the preference is to follow the Auckland 
delegation practice, Appendix IV provides a summary of what would be required). 
 
On the assumption that, as with the Auckland Council, other large councils would be the 
sole employer, asset owner and solely responsible for service delivery, there would 
nonetheless be merit in providing explicit power for local boards to determine their own 
administrative arrangements, subject to any cost above a baseline funded from the 
council’s general revenues being met by a local rate. 
 
In Australian jurisdictions – New South Wales with Sydney, and South Australia with 
Adelaide – it seems unlikely that any equivalent of the Auckland Council as the single 
local authority for an entire metropolitan area will emerge. This means the question of 
whether or not to establish local boards, and how they fit into a hierarchy of decision-
making from the relatively local, to the metropolitan, will be substantially different, at 
least to the extent that local board processes address matters on which their decisions 
will ultimately feed into decision-making at a metropolitan level. This may suggest both 
that decisions on whether or not to establish local boards should be coordinated at a 
metropolitan level (perhaps by an equivalent of New Zealand’s Local Government 
Commission), and that decisions by individual councils on what to delegate to local 
boards should be constrained in some way. One option would be for an equivalent of 
the Local Government Commission to have a role in promulgating general principles for 
delegation, and to mediate in any disputes between local boards and a parent council 
on the extent of delegation. In practice it would be hoped that these powers would not 
need to be exercised, but would have effect simply because they could be used. 
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2. Obligation on councils to promote community (neighbourhood) governance 
Legislation should include an obligation on councils to promote community 
(neighbourhood) governance, with the right of ‘communities’ to trigger the process of 
setting up community governance in their area. Councils should be required to develop 
a policy on community governance spelling out matters such as the nature of the 
support which the council would provide. It should include the conditions under which 
the council would facilitate the establishment of a community governance body by using 
the committee provisions in the relevant local government act as an alternative to any 
statutory provisions for a specific type of sub-council governance body such as a 
community board. The criteria for the recognition of ‘communities’ should be spelt out 
in legislation. There are precedents both in New Zealand legislation on community 
boards and English/Welsh legislation on neighbourhood forums (see the material in the 
appendices to this report). 
 
For councils which have the equivalent of Auckland style local boards, legislation should 
require the policy on community governance to be written on the basis that it is the 
local boards, rather than the parent council, which would play the lead role in 
enabling/facilitating community governance. The policy would need to include 
provisions regarding delegations to and funding for community governance entities, and 
giving local boards the power to put those delegations and funding arrangements in 
place. If local government legislation in an individual jurisdiction presented barriers to 
sub-delegation, or any other decision which a local board might otherwise take in 
implementing sub-council governance, the policy should make it clear that generally the 
parent council would accept any recommendations from a local board on those matters. 
 
The proposed policy on community governance should also include the council’s 
proposals for working with communities in furtherance of the emerging new role 
expected for local government in working in partnership with state (national) and other 
stakeholders.  
 
3. Generally sub-council governance should be an option not a requirement  
The experience we have reviewed leaves open the question of whether the legislation 
should provide explicitly (and solely) for a formal statutory sub-council governance 
structure similar to (say) New Zealand’s community boards, or whether it should 
provide for both statutory and non-statutory options. The latter would require councils 
to recognise entities which were outside the formal council structure, and the legislation 
would need to include criteria and a process governing recognition. The one example 
we have found of statutory expression of this approach is the Neighbourhood Forum 
option in the English Localism Act. 
 
We are more confident in arguing that the establishment of sub-council governance 
entities should generally be optional with the purpose of ensuring that there is a strong 
community commitment to ensuring their success. It is an option which could be 
triggered either by a council itself proposing the establishment of an entity or entities, 
and taking that through a consultation process (as required, for example, in New 
Zealand with the establishment of a new community board), or by a proposal/petition 
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from a community – as is the case for both New Zealand community boards and 
English/Welsh neighbourhood forums. 
 
4. Provision for sub-council governance entities where two or more councils are merged 
There may be a case for providing that where two or more councils are merged 
provision should be made for a sub-council governance entity for the area of each 
former council. Alternatively, reliance could be placed on the public consultation 
process to identify a wish for such an entity as residents of an about to be merged 
council would have the opportunity to put this forward. There would not be a need to 
make explicit statutory provision if the status of a small non-viable council is changed (as 
would be the case with the New South Wales Independent Panel’s proposal for smaller 
councils to become local boards under a county council), as, by definition, the former 
council would be reconstituted as a local board (in the generic sense) 
 
5. Tie community governance into long-term and annual strategic and operational 
planning frameworks 
The promotion of community governance should be tied into a council’s long-term and 
annual strategic and operational planning framework recognising that this should be 
based on the needs and aspirations of individual communities, rather than on an 
homogenous ‘one size fits all’ statement of aspirations for the entire district. Any 
guidelines should spell out an expectation community strategic plans would where 
possible be based on input from sub-council governance bodies established in 
accordance with these proposals. 
 
6. Develop and promulgate a good practice understanding of community 
engagement/community governance 
Finally, local government sectors should develop and promulgate a good practice 
understanding of how community engagement/community governance can contribute 
to better decision-making within councils themselves. The purpose of this 
recommendation is to ensure council management in particular is encouraged to 
understand that the purpose of community governance is not just enabling ‘local 
democracy’ but also ensuring the council itself has better and more detailed information 
about the needs and priorities of its different communities, both for its own planning 
purposes and to support its work with state agencies and other stakeholders on behalf 
of those communities. 
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APPENDIX I: PROVISIONS FOR ESTABLISHING COUNCIL COMMITTEES IN NEW SOUTH 
WALES, VICTORIA AND SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
Councils in New South Wales rely on a very simple provision in section 355 of the Local 
Government Act 1993 in order to establish committees: 
 
355 How does a council exercise its functions? 
A function of a council may, subject to this Chapter, be exercised: 
 (b) by a committee of the council, or 
 
Section 359 sets out a Council’s powers of delegation. Only service functions may be delegated 
to committees with non-councillor members. 
 
VICTORIA 
Section 86 of Victoria’s Local Government Act 1989 sets out the path councils to form 
committees as: 
 
86 Special committees of the Council 
(1) In addition to any advisory committees that a Council may establish, a Council may 
establish one or more special committees of the following— 
(a)  Councillors; 
(b)  Council staff; 
(c)  other persons; 
(d)  any combination of persons referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). 
 
The power of delegation in the same section is: 
 
(3)  Except as provided in subsection (4), a Council may by instrument of delegation delegate 
any of its functions, duties or powers under this or any other Act to a special committee. 
(4)  A Council cannot delegate to a committee the following powers— 
(a)  this power of delegation; 
(b)  to declare a rate or charge; 
(c)  to borrow money; 
(d) to enter into contracts for an amount exceeding an amount previously determined 
 by the Council; 
(e)  to incur any expenditure exceeding an amount previously determined by the 
 Council; 
(f)    any prescribed power. 
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SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
Section 41 of the Local Governance Act 1999 provides that a Council may establish committees 
to: 
(a)  assist the council in the performance of its functions; 
(b)  inquire into and report to the council on matters within the ambit of the council's 
responsibilities; 
(c)  provide advice to the council; 
(d)  exercise, perform or discharge delegated powers, functions or duties. 
 
Committees may consist of or include people who are not members of the Council. 
 
Councils have extensive powers of delegation with limitations primarily relating to financial 
matters, council strategic plans, establishment of subsidiaries and the making of bylaws. 
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APPENDIX II: THAMES-COROMANDEL DISCTRICT COUNCIL COMMUNITY BOARD 
DELEGATIONS 
 
DATE 13 July 2012 
 
 
Purpose of Report 
The purpose of this report is to provide a draft set of Community Board delegations for adoption 
by Thames-Coromandel District Council as one part of implementing the wider Community 
Governance Project in the District. 
 
Background 
The delegations will give effect to a new partnership approach to the governance of the district 
that will primarily be delivered through the five Community Boards. This approach was 
confirmed by Council in its adoption of the report "Getting Closer to the Community - 
Opportunities for New Approaches to Community Governance and Service Provision in the 
Thames Coromandel District" and the 23 associated recommendations on the 18th of April 2012. 
Some of the relevant decisions are provided below: 
 
Resolved 
At the 18 April 2012 Thames-Coromandel District Council meeting the Council adopted 
the Community Governance report with the following recommendations. 
 
That the Thames-Coromandel District Council: 
1. Adopts a proactive initiative to facilitate community empowerment and a new 
partnership approach to the governance of the District that will primarily be 
delivered through the five Community Boards. 
2. Whilst noting that it has overall accountability and responsibility under the Local 
Government Act 2002 for the governance of the District, Community Boards be 
granted authority to make governance decisions relating to the following 
activities/sub activities and as represented in Appendix F of the Thames 
Coromandel District Council Community Governance Report: 
 Harbour Facilities 
 Parks and Reserves 
 Halls  
 Libraries 
 Airfields 
 Swimming Pools 
 Public Conveniences 
 Cemeteries 
 Local Transportation 
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 Local Strategic Planning 
 Community Grants 
 Local Economic Development 
 Local Bylaw Levels of Service 
3. Determines that for all other activities (generally referred to as District Activities) 
Council will adopt the partnership approach where it seeks Community Board input 
prior to making significant governance decisions, including: 
 Wastewater 
 Water Supply 
 Solid Waste 
 Storm Water/Land Drainage 
 District Transportation 
 District Economic Development 
 Bylaws 
 Land use Planning and Land use Management 
 Strategic Planning 
 Emergency/Hazard Management 
4. Notes that it supports Community Boards to provide local leadership and develop 
relationships with the Council, the community and community organisations in 
developing local solutions within community board areas. 
5. Determines that an agreement setting out responsibilities and roles for Council and 
Community Boards be developed to record the new governance arrangements. 
6. Empowers Community Boards to develop Community Board Plans (CBPs) using the 
principles of the Auckland Local Board Plans and directions from the proposed 
Nelson Tasman District Council community board structure as a basis (but not 
limited to these) for inclusion in the Council's Ten Year Plan review process. 
7. Determines that while not exhaustive, some additional decision-making functions 
that Council will transfer to community boards are: 
  a) Developing Community Board Plans and proposed budgets for local activities 
that would generally be approved by Council subject to affordability and 
Council being satisfied it is meeting its overall accountability requirements. 
b) Decisions on leases associated with Council owned property. 
c) Developing and approving local policies such as Reserve Management Plans. 
 
8. Determines that with the increased governance role being delegated to Community 
Boards, that Council reviews the existing Council committee structure in relation to 
the role of its existing committees, particularly the Policy and Planning Committee 
and the Service Delivery Committee. Some of these committee functions could be 
delegated to Community Boards and the remaining functions addressed by Council 
or by Council established issue-specific committees. 
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The strengthened delegations are a key component in the delivery of a number of the 
recommendations by providing Community Boards increased decision making authority. 
 
Issue 
The issue being addressed in this report is the development and adoption of new community 
board delegations. As part of adopting new Community Board delegations amendments are also 
required to some existing Council committee delegations. To ensure clarity between new 
Community Board and Council committee responsibilities, revised committee delegations are 
also provided for adoption by Council as Attachments B and D to this report. 
 
Discussion 
The intent of the new delegations is to delegate authority and, as far as possible, responsibility 
to Community Boards to allow the five Community Boards to effectively govern and determine 
issues associated with their local areas. 
 
Some key changes from the existing to proposed Community Board delegations include: 
 
1. Community Boards assuming decision making authority for all local activity governance 
decisions.  
2. Local activities have been expanded to include parks and reserves, harbours, cemeteries, 
public conveniences, community centres (halls), libraries, airfields, swimming pools, local 
transportation (including footpaths, streetlights and town centre upgrades), local social 
development (community grants), local economic development (including information 
centres and other local initiatives), local strategic planning (including community 
planning) and local bylaw levels of service. 
3. Approval of all local activity levels of service. 
4. Authority to exercise all Council's authorities under the Reserves Act 1977 (where these 
may be delegated to Community Boards). 
5. Development and approval of local activity policies including reserve management plans, 
general management plans and development plans for local activities. 
6. Decision making authority for all leases, licences or concessions associated with all Council 
property within the community board area excluding Council administration land and 
buildings. 
7. Authority to determine the additional expenditure of up to $20,000 per annum. 
8. Approval of all local activity project definitions (previously this was restricted based on 
financial amount). 
9. The introduction of Community Board Plans. 
10. The ability to make recommendations on all Council property acquisitions and disposals. 
 
In establishing the new delegations, Council ultimately retains legal responsibility for the 
governance of the district and therefore the draft delegations provide the ability for Council to 
review Community Board decisions if necessary. Similarly a new process has been established to 
confirm the process where a community board may refer decisions to Council for determination. 
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Legal restrictions exist particularly within the Local Government Act 2002 that place some 
restrictions on the activities of community boards. 
 
The introduction of Community Board plans is intended to provide a structured approach and 
greater involvement for community board input into the Annual Plan and Ten Year Plan process, 
including budget setting. 
 
It is proposed that the exercise of the delegations be monitored over the next 12 months to 
inform any potential changes to the delegations when delegations are adopted post the October 
2013 elections. 
 
Suggested Resolutions 
That the Thames-Coromandel District Council: 
1. Receives the report.  
2. Adopts the draft Community Board delegations to apply from the 8 August 2012. 
 
Adopts the revised Service Delivery Committee and Judicial Committee delegations to apply 
from 8 August 2012. 
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APPENDIX III: OVERVIEW OF THE NEW ZEALAND PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING LOCAL 
BOARDS AND COMMUNITY BOARDS, INCLUDING THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 
 
Local Boards 
New local boards may be created by the Local Government Commission (the independent 
statutory body worth responsibility for overseeing local government reorganisation) as part of a 
reorganisation proposal, exercising powers under clause 15, schedule 3 of the Local Government 
Act 2002 provided that: 
 
 The Commission has determined that the preferred option for local government of an 
area is a unitary authority; and 
 
 The area will be urban or predominantly urban in nature; and has, or is predicted to 
have within a period of 5 years after public notice of the draft proposal, a population 
that exceeds 400 000. 
 
In preparing a draft proposal in relation to the affected area, the Commission may include 
provisions for local boards if it considers that good local government of the district of the 
unitary authority would be best promoted by providing for local boards. 
 
Community Boards 
New community boards may be established either as the result of a community initiative, or as 
part of a reorganisation proposal. Schedule 6 of the Local Government Act 2002 sets out the 
process for a community initiative. The process itself is relatively straightforward. The detailed 
provisions in the schedule are: 
 
Community Initiated  
3  Proposals to establish community 
(1) Not less than 10% of the electors of a continuous area, having a population of 1,500 persons 
or more and being within the district of a territorial authority, may propose that the area be 
constituted as a community. 
 
(2) Not fewer than 100 electors of a continuous area having a population of fewer than 1 500 
persons and being within the district of a territorial authority, being electors present at a 
meeting called by public notice by any elector or electors and being the majority of the electors 
present at that meeting, may propose that the area be constituted as a community. 
Compare: 1974 No 66 s 101ZI 
 
4  Requirements for proposal 
(1) A proposal to constitute a community must be accompanied by a plan or other description 
sufficient to identify the area.  
(2) Each signatory to the proposal must, against his or her signature, state his or her full name 
and the address in respect of which he or she possesses a qualification as an elector. 
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(3) The proposal, or a copy of it, must be delivered or sent by post to the chief executive at the 
principal office of the territorial authority affected by the proposal. 
 
(4) The chief executive of the territorial authority must— 
(a) check whether or not each signatory to the proposal possesses a qualification as an 
elector; and 
(b) not later than 1 month after receiving the proposal, forward the proposal to the 
territorial authority, together with a certificate specifying the number of signatories to 
the proposal who are qualified as electors. 
 
(5) In the absence of proof to the contrary, the certificate of the chief executive is final. 
 
(6) The territorial authority must then consider the proposal and determine whether or not to 
constitute the community. 
 
5  Proposal seeking constitution of communities 
(1) A proposal seeking the constitution of a community by means of a resolution must be— 
(a) submitted to the territorial authority; and 
(b) considered by the territorial authority at its next meeting or subsequent meeting. 
 
(2) If a territorial authority has considered a proposal, it must— 
(a) resolve to give effect to the proposal and invite public submissions on it; or 
(b) reject the proposal and give public notice of the rejection. 
 
 (3) If a territorial authority has resolved to give effect to a proposal and to invite public 
submissions on it, it must give public notice of the intended resolution, and a copy of the 
proposal and a copy of the plan showing the boundaries of the proposed community must be 
prepared and deposited in the principal office of the territorial authority and in any other place 
or places that it considers necessary. 
 
(4) Each proposal and associated plan must be open for inspection by the public without fee for 
a period of 28 days following public notice of the proposal, and public notice must be given of 
the times and places where the proposal and plan are available. 
 
(5) A person or group of persons may make a written submission on the proposal within that 
period of 28 days or any further period that the territorial authority may allow, and each 
submission must be considered by the territorial authority, which must resolve to— 
(a) adopt the proposal; or 
(b) reject the proposal. 
 
If a local authority declines a proposal to establish a community board, any signatory to the 
proposal may then appeal to the Local Government commission. The appeal provisions in 
schedule 6 provide: 
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Appeal against refusal to constitute community 
(1) If, following a proposal to constitute a community, a territorial authority resolves not to 
constitute a community, a signatory to the proposal may appeal to the Commission. 
 
(2) The Commission has all the powers of the territorial authority in respect of the constitution 
of the community, and may determine the functions of the community board for a period of up 
to 3 years. 
 
(3) Nothing in subclause (2) prevents the territorial authority from conferring further 
responsibilities on the community board. 
 
As part of a Reorganisation Proposal 
The Local Government Commission, in preparing a draft proposal or a reorganisation scheme 
under schedule 3 of the Local Government Act 2002 may consider whether good local 
government of any affected district would be best promoted by— 
 
(a) a system of communities and the responsibilities, duties, and powers of the community 
boards in the district; or 
(b) an alternative to an existing system of communities; or 
(c) a change in the responsibilities, duties, and powers of the community boards in the district. 
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APPENDIX IV: ESTABLISHMENT OF NEIGHBOURHOOD FORUMS 
Schedule 6 of the Localism Act 2011 sets out the following process for the 
establishment/recognition of neighbourhood forums: 
61F Authorisation to act in relation to neighbourhood areas 
(1) For the purposes of a neighbourhood development order, a parish council are authorised to 
act in relation to a neighbourhood area if that area consists of or includes the whole or any part 
of the area of the council. 
 
(2) If that neighbourhood area also includes the whole or any part of the area of another parish 
council, the parish council is authorised for those purposes to act in relation to that 
neighbourhood area only if the other parish council have given their consent. 
 
(3) For the purposes of a neighbourhood development order, an organisation or body is 
authorised to act in relation to a neighbourhood area if it is designated by a local planning 
authority as a neighbourhood forum for that area. 
 
(4) An organisation or body may be designated for a neighbourhood area only if that area does 
not consist of or include the whole or any part of the area of a parish council. 
 
(5) A local planning authority may designate an organisation or body as a neighbourhood forum 
if the authority are satisfied that it meets the following conditions— 
(a) it is established for the express purpose of promoting or improving the social, 
economic and environmental well-being of an area that consists of or includes the 
neighbourhood area concerned (whether or not it is also established for the express 
purpose of promoting the carrying on of trades, professions or other businesses in such 
an area); 
(b) its membership is open to— 
(i) individuals who live in the neighbourhood area concerned, 
(ii) individuals who work there (whether for businesses carried on there or 
otherwise), and 
(iii) individuals who are elected members of a county council, district council or 
London borough council any of whose area falls within the neighbourhood area 
concerned; 
(c) its membership includes a minimum of 21 individuals each of whom— 
(i) lives in the neighbourhood area concerned, 
(ii) works there (whether for a business carried on there or otherwise), or 
(iii) is an elected member of a county council, district council or London borough 
council any of whose area falls within the neighbourhood area concerned; 
(d) it has a written constitution, and 
(e) such other conditions as may be prescribed. 
 
(6) A local planning authority may also designate an organisation or body as a neighbourhood 
forum if they are satisfied that the organisation or body meets prescribed conditions. 
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(7) A local planning authority— 
(a) must, in determining under subsection (5) whether to designate an organisation or 
body as a neighbourhood forum for a neighbourhood area, have regard to the 
desirability of designating an organisation or body— 
(i) which has secured (or taken reasonable steps to attempt to secure) that its 
membership includes at least one individual falling within each of sub-
paragraphs (i) to (iii) of subsection (5)(b), 
(ii) whose membership is drawn from different places in the neighbourhood 
area concerned and from different sections of the community in that area, and 
(iii) whose purpose reflects (in general terms) the character of that area, 
(b) may designate only one organisation or body as a neighbourhood forum for each 
neighbourhood area, 
(c) may designate an organisation or body as a neighbourhood forum only if the 
organisation or body has made an application to be designated, and 
(d) must give reasons to an organisation or body applying to be designated as a 
neighbourhood forum where the authority refuse the application. 
 
(8) A designation— 
(a) ceases to have effect at the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the day on 
which it is made but without affecting the validity of any proposal for a neighbourhood 
development order made before the end of that period, and 
(b) in the case of the designation of an unincorporated association, is not to be affected 
merely because of a change in the membership of the association. 
 
(9) A local planning authority may withdraw an organisation or body’s designation as a 
neighbourhood forum if they consider that the organisation or body is no longer meeting— 
(a) the conditions by reference to which it was designated, or 
(b) any other criteria to which the authority were required to have regard in making the 
designation; 
and, where an organisation or body’s designation is withdrawn, the authority must give reasons 
to the organisation or body. 
 
(10) A proposal for a neighbourhood development order by a parish council or neighbourhood 
forum may not be made at any time in relation to a neighbourhood area if there is at that time 
another proposal by the council or forum in relation to that area that is outstanding. 
 
(11) Each local planning authority must make such arrangements as they consider appropriate 
for making people aware as to the times when organisations or bodies could make applications 
to be designated as neighbourhood forums for neighbourhood areas. 
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APPENDIX V: SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS FOR AUCKLAND LOCAL BOARDS 
 
Summarised from the Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009 
 A local board must be established for each local board area for the purposes of— 
o enabling democratic decision making by, and on behalf of, communities within the 
local board area; and 
o better enabling the promotion of the social, economic, environmental, and cultural 
well-being of communities within the local board area, in the present and for the 
future.  
 A local board consists of between 5 and 12 elected members, and is elected in accordance 
with the Local Electoral Act. 
 Status of local boards 
o A local board is an unincorporated body. 
o A local board is not a local authority, a community board, or a committee of the 
governing body. 
o A local board may not (a) acquire, hold, or dispose of property; or (b) appoint, 
suspend, or remove employees.  
 Unlike other local authorities, both the governing body and the local boards are responsible 
and democratically accountable for the decision making of the Auckland Council. Whether 
responsibility for making any particular decision rests with the governing body or 1 or more 
or all of the local boards depends on the nature of the decision being made. 
 Each local board is responsible and democratically accountable for: 
o the decision making of the Auckland Council in relation to local non-regulatory 
activities that are allocated to it in accordance with the principles set out below 
o identifying and communicating the interests and preferences of the people in its 
local board area in relation to the content of the strategies, policies, plans, and 
bylaws of the Auckland Council; and 
o identifying and developing bylaws specifically for its local board area, and proposing 
them to the governing body  
o the agreement reached with the governing body (local board agreement) in respect 
of local activities for its local board area. 
 Principles for allocation of decision-making responsibilities of Auckland Council 
o Decision-making responsibility for any local non-regulatory activity of the Auckland 
Council must be allocated by the governing body after considering the views and 
preferences expressed by each local board. 
o Decision-making responsibility for a local non-regulatory activity should be exercised 
by local boards unless the nature of the activity is such that decision making on an 
Auckland-wide basis will better promote the well-being of the communities across 
Auckland because the impact of the decision will extend beyond a single local board 
area; or effective decision making will require alignment or integration with other 
decisions that are the responsibility of the governing body; or the benefits of a 
consistent or co-ordinated approach across Auckland will outweigh the benefits of 
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reflecting the diverse needs and preferences of the communities within each local 
board area. 
o The Long Term Plan and each annual plan must identify the local non-regulatory 
activities of the Auckland Council for which decision-making responsibility is 
allocated to local boards. 
 Local boards funding policy  
o To provide predictability and certainty about levels of funding for local boards, the 
Auckland Council must adopt a local boards funding policy as part of its long-term 
plan. 
o The local boards funding policy must set the formula by which the total funds 
allocated by the Council for meeting the cost of funding local activities are to be 
allocated to each local board; and the formula by which the total funds allocated by 
the Council for meeting the cost of funding the administrative support to local 
boards are to be allocated to each local board. 
o The local boards funding policy must also identify any funding (except funding 
dedicated to particular purposes) that may be available to local boards for local 
activities and the criteria or process by which it may be allocated to them. 
o The formula must allocate funds between the local boards in a way that provides an 
equitable capacity for the local boards to enhance the well-being of the 
communities in each of their local board areas; and in a way that provides equitable 
resources and support to each local board. 
 Local board plans 
o Each local board must adopt a local board plan in the year immediately after the 
year of each triennial general election. 
o The purpose of a local board plan is: to reflect the priorities and preferences of the 
communities within the local board area in respect of the level and nature of local 
activities to be provided by the Auckland Council over the next 3 years; to identify 
and describe the interests and preferences of the people within the local board 
area; to provide a basis for developing the local board agreement for each of the 
next 3 years; to inform the development of the next long term plan, particularly in 
relation to the identification of the local non-regulatory activities of the Council for 
which decision-making responsibility should be allocated to the local board; to 
provide a basis for accountability of the local board to the communities in the local 
board area; and to provide an opportunity for people to participate in decision-
making processes on the nature and level of local activities to be provided by the 
Council within the local board area. 
o A local board plan must include a statement of the levels of services proposed for 
the local board area, if any; and an indicative local board budget. 
 Local board agreements 
o For each financial year, the Auckland Council must have a local board agreement (as 
agreed between the governing body and the local board) for each local board area. 
o A local board agreement must set out how the Auckland Council will, in the year to 
which the agreement relates, reflect the priorities and preferences in the local 
board’s plan in respect of: the local activities to be provided in the local board area; 
and the responsibilities, duties, or powers delegated to the local board. 
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o The long term plan and each annual plan of the Auckland Council must include the 
local board agreement for each local board area. 
 Monitoring and Reporting 
o Each local board must monitor the implementation of the local board agreement for 
its local board area. 
o Each annual report of the Auckland Council must include, in respect of local 
activities for each local board area, an audited statement that compares the level of 
service achieved in relation to the performance target or targets as stated in the 
local board agreement for that year; specifies whether any intended changes to the 
level of service have been achieved; and gives the reasons for any significant 
variation between the level of service achieved and the intended level of service. 
o Each local board must comment on those matters in respect of its local board area 
and the Council must include those comments in the annual report. 
 
